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Section 514(a) of the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA)' states that, subject to certain exceptions set forth
in section 514(b), titles I and IV of ERISA "supersede any and
all State laws insofar as they. . . relate to any employee benefit
plan."2 On the basis of the experience in the courts and Congress in the ten years since ERISA's enactment, it is clear that
the inclusion of section 514(a) in ERISA was a mistake. Given
well-established judicial doctrines of preemption, section 514(a)
was unnecessary. And, while judicial doctrines have been molded
by sensitivity to what is practicable and a reasonable balancing
of competing interests, the categorical language and wider scope
of section 514(a) has unavoidably at times called for unreasonable and impractical results. In short, the adoption of section
514(a) not only failed to fill any real need, but also created unnecessary problems for both the judiciary and those affected by
private employee benefit plans.
The language of section 514(a) sweeps as broadly as the
English language allows. In view of this breadth, judicial refusal
to hold preempted any state law that touches upon an employee
pension or welfare benefit plan strains ordinary notions of the
proper boundaries between the legislative and judicial domains.
Anyone advocating that ERISA preempts a particular state law
can present an impressive array of arguments for that position,
from the need to obey plain legislative language to the clearly
enunciated congressional intent to free employee benefit plans
from all but the specifically excepted areas of state law and reg1. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of titles 5, 18, 26, 29, 31 & 42 U.S.C.).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1982) (emphasis added). ERISA defines "employee benefit
plan" as "an employee welfare benefit plan or employee pension benefit plan or a plan
which is both an employee welfare benefit plan and an employee pension benefit plan."
ERISA § 3(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3) (1982). An "employee welfare benefit plan" is any
plan, fund, or program established or maintained by an employer or employee organization for the purpose of providing benefits such as health care, sick pay, vacation pay,
accident, disability, death, unemployment, training, day care, scholarship, and prepaid
legal services benefits. ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1982). An "employee pension
benefit plan" is a plan, fund, or program providing retirement income or resulting in
deferral of employee income until termination of employment or beyond. ERISA § 3(2),
29 U.S.C. § 1002(2) (1982). ERISA imposes reporting, disclosure, and fiduciary responsibility requirements on both types of plans. However, while ERISA governs certain substantive provisions of pension plans, see, e.g., ERISA §§ 201-211, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1061
(1982), ERISA does not regulate the content of welfare benefit plans.
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ulation. 3 Strict adherence to the literal scope and language of
section 514(a), however, deprives courts of the flexibility that
has proven crucially important in addressing questions of federal
preemption and in the development of a "federal common law."
The literal approach also makes it embarrassingly clear that
Congress enacted ERISA while still oblivious to numerous
problems related to benefit plans that the states had already
recognized and addressed. At least one of ERISA's principal authors has consistently suggested that the apparent principle section 514(a) states is broader than the rule that ought to be
enforced.4
The result has been an unhealthy conflict between two important sets of public policies: those regarding the protection of employee benefits, as expressed in section 2 of ERISA, 5 and those
governing the proper relationship of the judicial and legislative
branches. Federal preemption of state law relating to pensions
has engendered a collection of decisions notable for their diverse
rationales and their diverse levels of rationality. For courts that
only recently undertook the painstaking labor of crafting a federal common law of pensions, such questions surrounding the
extent and purposes of preemption are unfortunate.
This Article attempts to describe the ways in which, and the
reasons why, section 514(a) has caused the courts and Congress
so much difficulty.6 Part I reviews the legislative history of section 514(a), with emphasis on the ambivalence Congress has
shown toward its 1974 draftsmanship. Part II attempts to pro3. A thorough, principled argument for applying § 514(a) as broadly as possible is set
forth in Hutchinson & Ifshin, Federal Preemption of State Law Under the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 46 U. Cm. L. REV. 23 (1978). In Kilberg &
Inman, Preemption of State Laws Relating to Employee Benefit Plans: An Analysis of
ERISA Section 514, 62 TEx. L. REV. 1313 (1984), the authors suggest an interpretation of
§ 514 under which § 514 is said to provide "more guidance for the proper resolution of
the 'relate to' determination than either courts or commentators have recognized." Id. at
1338. However, application of that interpretation apparently results in an extremely
broad presumptive sweep similar to that urged by Hutchinson & Ifshin. See Kilberg &
Inman, supra at 1331-36.
4. Remarks of Senator Javits in this vein are discussed infra notes 12-13 and accompanying text. Commentaries critical of the difficulties § 514 creates include Kilberg &
Heron, The Preemption of State Law Under ERISA, 1979 DuKE L.J. 383; Turza & Halloway, Preemptionof State Laws Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974, 28 CATH. U.L. REV. 163 (1979); Note, ERISA: Preemption of State Health Care
Laws and Worker Well-Being, 1981 U. ILL. L. REV. 825.
5. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982).
6. Because this Article deals primarily with interpretation of the phrase "relate to" as
used in § 514(a), issues regarding the original exceptions to § 514(a), such as the insurance, banking, and securities law savings clause in § 514(b)(2), and the federal law savings clause in § 514(d), are beyond its scope. Those issues are briefly discussed, however,
where necessary to make sense of developments under § 514(a).
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vide a coherent description of the case law that has developed
under section 514(a).7 Part III completes the legislative history
by examining the two instances in which experience compelled
Congress to revise section 514. Finally, Part IV discusses examples of problems courts have faced when crafting a federal common law of employee benefits in light of section 514, and concludes that the peculiar absence in section 514 of any
recognition of state policies has had an adverse effect on the
common law process. The primary shortcoming of section 514 is
that, although it establishes a good starting point for thinking
about ERISA preemption, it falls short both as a practical rule
and as a guide to principled decisionmaking. Courts have thus
had little choice but to create a federal common law of ERISA,
including preemption, in spite of, and to some extent hindered
by, the literal language of the statute.
I.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION

514

As the courts and commentators have often remarked, section
514 is the most expansive preemption clause Congress considered while drafting ERISA. 8 Earlier versions of the bill that was
to become ERISA limited the scope of preemption to state regulation of areas or subject matters specifically regulated by the
federal legislation. But this was thought to be unsatisfactory.
Senator Javits, ranking minority member of the Committee on
Labor and Public Welfare, stated:
Both House and Senate bills provided for preemption
of State law, but-with one major exception appearing in
the House bill-defined the perimeters of preemption in
relation to the areas regulated by the bill. Such a formulation raised the possibility of endless litigation over the
validity of State action that might impinge on Federal
regulation, as well as opening the door to multiple and
potentially conflicting State laws hastily contrived to deal
7. This description is organized chiefly by reference to the subject matter and the
results of the cases discussed. Thus it differs from the fairly recent discussion of the case
law in Part iI of Kilberg & Inman, supra note 3, where the authors offered a description
of the case law organized by reference to the analytical approaches of the published
decisions.
8. See, e.g., Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes, 425 F. Supp. 1294, 1298-1300 (N.D. Cal.
1977), aff'd per curiam, 571 F.2d 502 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 831 (1978); Committee on Fiduciary Responsibility, Preemption and ERISA, 13 A.B.A. RE:AL PROP. PROB.
& TR. J. 977, 978-82 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Preemption and ERISA].
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with some particular aspect of private welfare or pension
benefit plans not clearly connected to the Federal regulatory scheme.'
As enacted, section 514 was intended to be very broad indeed.
Senator Williams, floor manager of the bill and Chairman of the
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, stated that, except in
limited circumstances, it would "preempt the field for Federal
regulations, thus eliminating the threat of conflicting or inconsistent State and local regulation of employee benefit plans. This
principle is intended to apply in its broadest sense to all actions
of State or local governments, or any instrumentality thereof,
which have the force or effect of law."' Representative Dent,
Chairman of the Subcommittee on Labor of the House Labor
and Education Committee, characterized section 514 as "the reservation to Federal authority [of] the sole power to regulate the
field of employee benefit plans.""
The foregoing remarks are unambiguous and widely quoted,
and have removed all substantial doubt about the expansive
meaning of ERISA's language. Senator Javits, however, went beyond interpretation of the statutory language in his remarks. He
suggested that section 514 was perhaps an overinclusive starting
point for preemption analysis, noting parenthetically that "the
desirability of further regulation-at either the State or Federal
level-undoubtedly warrants further attention." 2 Senator Javits
predicted that Congress would alter section 514 in the future if
experience showed that it cut too deeply into the states' responsibilities.13 He thus suggested that if section 514 turned out to
reflect a less than optimal policy choice, it was not up to the
courts to create exceptions in pursuit of a better policy, even
though fashioning new applications of settled principles is traditionally the role of the judiciary, not Congress. Senator Javits's
9. 120 CONG. REC. 29,942 (1974).
10. Id. at 29,933.
11. Id. at 29,197.
12. Id. at 29,942.
13.
The conferees-recognizing the dimensions of such a [preemption] policy-also
agreed to assign the Congressional Pension Task Force the responsibility of
studying and evaluating preemption in connection with State authorities and
reporting its findings to the Congress. If it is determined that the preemption
policy devised has the effect of precluding essential legislation at either the State
or Federal level, appropriate modifications can be made.
Id. ERISA § 3022(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 1222(a)(5) (1982), commanded a Joint Congressional
Task Force to study "the effects and desirability of the Federal preemption of State and
local law with respect to matters relating to pension and similar plans."
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remarks, read in conjunction with the mandate of section 3022
of ERISA to the Joint Pension Task Force to study the practical
effect and desirability of federal preemption, forecast further
congressional inquiry into this area, and indicated that judicial
tinkering would be inappropriate. It would have been appropriate, though, to have been skeptical about Congress's ability to
respond flexibly when unforeseen circumstances demonstrated
the wisdom of preserving an active role for state laws relating to
benefit plans; one also might have been skeptical about the willingness of courts to relinquish their traditional role of accommodating rigid statutory language to myriad and varying factual
circumstances.
Post-ERISA activity on Capitol Hill, although not as authoritative as pre-ERISA legislative history," confirms that section
514(a) was more in the nature of a quick statement of general
principle than a workable, final rule.1 5 It also confirms that Congress has been unable to respond with sufficient speed and flexibility to the problems arising in preemption litigation under section 514(a). In oversight hearings in 1977 and 1978, House and
Senate subcommittees received voluminous testimony from state
officials, employer representatives, and insurance company representatives calling for both broader and narrower preemption
rules. In 1979 Senators Williams and Javits introduced a bill,
S. 209,6 with provisions that would have fine-tuned section 514
to accomplish some of the objectives sought by each side of the
14. See generally Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, 447 U.S. 102,
116-19 & n.13 (1980) (discussing the significance to be attached to varieties of subsequent legislative history).
15. During one post-ERISA hearing, Rep. Erlenborn (R.-Ill.) gave an interesting
hindsighted view of § 514's genesis and intent:
First of all, let me say, having been through the entire legislative history of
ERISA from the days the first proposals were made until the President signed a
bill into law on Labor Day, 1974, one of the most dramatic changes in that legislative and political history of ERISA was the growing tendency of States to intervene in this area with laws to regulate pension and welfare plans.
That changed the political environment where many people who were opposed
to the passage of Federal legislation were now seeking Federal legislation with
preemption. That was key to the political support that was necessary to get
ERISA enacted into law. It was the fear of having 50 different regulators in the
50 different States that led many employers to the conclusion that a Federal law
was now desirable, a Federal law with comprehensive preemption.
Oversight on ERISA, 1978: Hearings on Public Law 93-406 Before the Subcomm. on
Labor Standardsof the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 531
(1978) [hereinafter cited as 1978 Oversight Hearings] (emphasis added).
16. 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 933 (1979), reprinted in ERISA Improvements Act of 1979: Hearings on S. 209 Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human
Resources, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1979) [hereinafter referred to as 1979 ERISA Improvements Hearings].
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preemption controversy. Senator Javits, introducing the bill on
the Senate floor, gave a detailed account of its purposes: it
would create a new exception for certain "groundbreaking" state
legislation; 17 it would affirm certain cases in which courts upheld
state laws, despite their obvious "relation to" employee benefit
plans; 18 it would overrule one court decision upholding other
state laws;1 9 and finally, it was proposed "that committee report
language affirm" two court decisions preempting state laws dealing with still other subject matters.20 An interim report by the
Senate Labor Committee on S. 209 affirmed Senator Javits's
remarks. 2 '
Although there is nothing unusual about corrective legislation,
S. 209 was a rather unusual example. Senator Javits was recommending legislation dealing with a multitude of fact patterns, to
each of which courts would normally be deemed capable of applying statutory rules. Only because of the extraordinary
breadth of section 514, and perhaps because it was merely intended as a "first cut" at the preemption problem, was Congress
faced, after less than five years of ERISA's operation, with such
a laundry list of proposed extensions and curtailments. It turned
out, however, that there was insufficient support for these refinements, and the bill was not passed. Similarly, the intended congressional Joint Pension Task Force study on preemption failed
to materialize, with the result that, despite ERISA's mandate,
there is still no comprehensive congressional study of preemp17. 125 CONG. REC. 947 (1979), reprinted in 1979 ERISA Improvements Hearings,
supra note 16, at 99, 107. Senator Javits referred to the Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act,
which was struck down in Standard Oil Co. v. Agsalud, 442 F. Supp. 695 (N.D. Cal.
1977), affd, 633 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1980), aff'd mem., 454 U.S. 801 (1981). For a discussion of Agsalud see infra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
18. 125 CONG. REC. 947 (1979), reprinted in 1979 ERISA Improvements Hearings,
supra note 16, at 107. Senator Javits referred to Stone v. Stone, 450 F. Supp. 919 (N.D.
Cal. 1978), afl'd, 632 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 922 (1981); and
similar cases. For a discussion of Stone see infra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
19. 125 CONG. REc. 947 (1979), reprinted in 1979 ERISA Improvements Hearings,
supra note 16, at 107. The decisioa to be overruled was Wadsworth v. Whaland, 562 F.2d
70 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 980 (1978). The correctness of this decision was
recently confirmed in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 105 S. Ct. 2380
(1985). For a discussion of Metropolitan Life see infra text accompanying notes 148-50.
20. 125 CONG. REC. 947 (1979), reprinted in 1979 ERISA Improvements Hearings,
supra note 16, at 107. The decisions to be affirmed were Azzaro v. Harnett, 414 F. Supp.
473 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd mem., 553 F.2d 93 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 824 (1977),
and National Carriers' Conference Comm. v. Heffernan, 454 F. Supp. 914 (D. Conn.
1978). For a discussion of Hefternan, see infra notes 139-43 and accompanying text.
21. SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND HUMAN RESOURCES, 96TH CONG., 1ST SESS., S. 209:
THE ERISA IMPROvEMENTs AcT OF 1979: SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF CONSIDERATION 46-49
(Comm. Print 1979) [hereinafter cited as S. 209 SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS].
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tion, nor any sign that one is likely.2 2
Although the bill Senator Javits discussed in 1979 was not enacted, two of its preemption-limiting aims were realized in legislation passed in 1983 and 1984. This. legislation will be discussed
following analysis of the case law that gave rise to the issues
Senator Javits discussed. For present purposes, it should simply
be noted that neither before nor after enactment of ERISA did
Congress-let alone the courts or various litigants-view preemption policy issues as settled in the way that the sweeping
statutory language of section 514 might suggest.
II.

INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF SECTION

514

BY THE

COURTS

Although section 514(a) seems to preempt state law unequivocally, courts have often analyzed section 514 in terms of the
traditional judicial preemption doctrines that operate independently of any specific statutory preemption provision."3 Such
analysis belies the facially plausible premise that "[s]tatutory
preemption clauses eliminate the need for judicial inquiry into
the overall purposes of national statutes and into the effect of
state laws on the implementation of those statutes."2 " Likewise,
it shows that courts have often rejected the view that "[tihe historic judicial approaches toward implied federal preemption of
state laws in the same field . . . seem of little relevance to the
22. An early congressional study appeared in the 1977 AcTivrry REPORT OF THE
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, H.R. REP. No. 1785, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 38,
46 (1977). The authors identified only one case decided up to that point "directly explor[ing] the scope of section 514," id. at 50, and the only discussion of § 514(a) consisted of criticism of attempts to narrow the section. The authors concluded both that
the general policy of § 514(a) "should not be disturbed" and that it may be necessary to
narrow the statutory exceptions to it under § 514(b). Id. at 47.
23. Courts have justified analyses that look beyond the "plain meaning" of § 514(a)
by reference to a Supreme Court dictum on the interpretation of statutes: "When aid to
construction of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available, there certainly
can be no 'rule of law' which forbids its use, however clear the words may appear on
'superficial examination.'" Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc., 426
U.S. 1, 10 (1976) (quoting United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 54344 (1940)). See Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes, 571 F.2d 502, 504 n.4 (9th Cir.) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 831 (1978). Cf. Standard Oil Co. v. Agsalud, 442 F. Supp.
695, 702 (N.D. Cal. 1977), a/i'd, 633 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1980), aff'd mem., 454 U.S. 801
(1981) ("CPIRG did not make a federal rule of 'the quip that only when legislative history is doubtful do you go to the statute,'" quoting Frankfurter, Some Reflections on
the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 543 (1947)). The legislative history of
§ 514, however, merely confirms its plain meaning. By comparison with the case law
under § 514(a), the CPIRG dictum states a very conservative proposition.
24. Note, A Framework for Preemption Analysis, 88 YALE L.J. 363, 364-65 (1978).
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interpretation of ERISA." 5
The approach of many courts interpreting section 514 has
been to balance state and federal interests under the guise of
determining whether state laws that affect plans also "relate to"
such plans within the meaning of section 514. In performing this
balancing test on any particular state statute, courts have asked
questions such as the following:
1. Does the state law regulate a matter ERISA regulates?
State laws governing matters such as funding, disclosure, or fiduciary responsibility, which are also governed by ERISA, can
be distinguished from laws that regulate employee benefit plans
in ways that ERISA does not. Examples of the latter type of
state laws are those requiring the inclusion of certain types of
benefits in welfare benefit plans. 6
2. What is the principal purpose the state law was designed
to promote? Some state laws may have been prompted by the
same concerns that impelled Congress to enact ERISA, such as
ensuring the security of employees' claims to pension or welfare
benefits. Other state laws that affect employee benefit plans,
however, may reflect other core concerns, such as the protection
of civil rights, familial support rights, or creditors' rights.
3. To what degree does the state law affect employee benefit
plans? Laws of "general application," in particular, are more
likely to be found to have only a minor or incidental impact on
employee benefit plans. 7 But other laws might also be found to
affect plans "in too tenuous, remote, or peripheral [a] manner to
2
find that the law 'relates to' the plan.1
Broadly speaking, there are a number of cases in which the
answers to these and similar questions have shaped the outcome
of the ultimate ERISA preemption issues in just the way that
25. Preemption and ERISA, supra note 8,at 987.
26. See supra note 2.
27. The "general applicability" of the law, by itself, may or may not properly be
taken into consideration in preemption analysis. On one hand, for example, § 514(b)(4)
saves the "generally applicable criminal law of a state" from preemption. (Conflicting
decisions construing the meaning of this savings clause are briefly discussed infra notes
66-67 and accompanying text.) On the other hand, courts in other preemption contexts
have concluded quite sensibly that general applicability per se is not sufficient to avoid
preemption:
Nor has it mattered whether the States have acted through laws of broad general
application rather than laws specifically directed towards the governance of industrial relations. Regardless of the mode adopted, to allow the States to control
conduct which is the subject of national [labor] regulation would create potential
frustration of national purposes.
San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959) (footnote omitted).
28. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 100 n.21 (1983).
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they would affect a preemption decision rendered under the general judicial doctrines of preemption that operate without any
specific statutory provision. 9 One such doctrine is stated in a
well-known dictum by Justice Frankfurter:
[D]ue regard for the presuppositions of our embracing
federal system, including the principle of diffusion of
power not as a matter of doctrinaire localism but as a
promoter of democracy, has required us not to find withdrawal from the States of power to regulate where the
activity regulated was a merely peripheral concern of the
Labor-Management Relations Act. . . . Or where the
regulated conduct touched interests so deeply rooted in
local feeling and responsibility that, in the absence of
compelling congressional direction, we could not infer
that Congress has deprived the States of the power to
act. 0
These observations do not produce an easily applied rule of decision. Courts addressing questions of preemption either generally or under section 514(a) with this dictum in mind may well
draw varying conclusions as to whether the state regulation in
question is "peripheral" to ERISA concerns, and whether the
state-regulated matters are important to "local feeling and responsibility." Moreover, the subject matters addressed by a particular state law may be of intense interest to the state, yet of
more than "peripheral concern" under ERISA. How competing
state and federal interests should be weighed and balanced in
resolving preemption questions turns on perceptions and values
about which courts may reasonably be expected to disagree.
On its face, section 514(a) would seem to restrict the possibilities for such disagreements, for it gives courts and litigants reason to believe that the traditional tests should be ignored. But in
some cases it is hard to avoid the conclusion that section 514(a)
is the standard being ignored, if only implicitly. This disregard
of section 514(a) raises the question whether ERISA would have
29. Accord Kilberg & Inman, supra note 3, at 1316. Although these authors have
drawn a similar conclusion regarding some of the decided cases, they have ascribed the
perceived departure of actual result from statutory language primarily to judicial "inability" rather than "judicial activism." Id. The record of the courts is not so much an indication of judicial fault of any kind, however, as it is an indication of the impracticability
of the statutory language adopted by Congress.
30. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 243-44 (1959) (footnote
omitted). See also New York Tel. Co. v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 440 U.S. 519,
539-40 & n.33 (1979).
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made more sense without section 514. If ERISA preemption decisions had arrived at the same kind of accommodation of state
and federal interests that has emerged under the Labor-Management Relations Act, 31 which has no express preemption provision, then the language of section 514(a) would have been unnecessary, but harmless. Instead, the courts have waffled between
contrary approaches, one of which seems mandated by the language of section 514(a), the other by sound policy considerations. Under this second approach, ERISA is viewed as "occupying the entire field, '32 but not to the total exclusion of
compatible state laws of general application or those protecting
certain core interests of intense and legitimate concern to the
states. No court has expressly advanced such a view; but its occasional, implicit adoption might account for lapses in statutory
analysis in opinions. As the Supreme Court observed in 1981,
the language of section 514(a) "gives rise to some confusion." 3
The Supreme Court seems clearly to have intended to curb
this flexible, balancing of interests approach in its decisions in
Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 4 Shaw v. Delta Air
Lines3 5 and Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts.3 Dicta in Alessi can be read as emphasizing the breadth
and power of section 514(a), and such readings undoubtedly
have had important effects on subsequent lower-court decisions
having no factual relationship to Alessi.5 7 In Shaw the Court observed that "[a] law 'relates to' an employee benefit plan, in the
normal sense of the phrase, if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan." 8 It went on to imply that this "normal
sense" was the sense Congress intended, but the Court then
seemed to backtrack in a puzzling footnote that stated: "Some
state actions may affect employee benefit plans in too tenuous,
remote, or peripheral a manner to warrant a finding that the law
31. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-188 (1982); see generally Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
32. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes, 425 F. Supp. 1294, 1299 (N.D. Cal. 1977), aff'd
per curiam, 571 F.2d 502 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 831 (1978).
33. Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 523-24 (1981).
34. 451 U.S. 504 (1981).
35. 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
36. 105 S. Ct. 2380 (1985).
37. See, e.g., Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 679 F.2d
1307 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated on other grounds, 463 U.S. 1 (1983); Delta Air Lines v.
Kramarsky, 666 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1981), aff'd sub nom. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S.
85 (1983). Franchise Tax Bd. is discussed infra notes 129-35 and accompanying text.
The key issues in Kramarsky are discussed infra notes 64, 78, 164 and text accompanying notes 64, 74-78.
38. 463 U.S. at 96-97.
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'relates to' the plan."' In MetropolitanLife, the Court seems to
have indicated an intention to forestall resort to this exception,
stating that Shaw gave ERISA's "relate to" language its "broad
common-sense meaning, ' 0 and raising a plausible inference that
this common-sense meaning was unencumbered by any exceptions for tenuous, remote, or peripheral effects.41
The current state of judicial ERISA preemption is further affected by legislation that has grown out of the disputes that
spawned some of the most troublesome preemption issues in the
courts. Although it is probably true that uncertainty in this area
is in decline, the rules that have emerged are not necessarily
grounded in any widely accepted policy framework.
A.

Preemption of State Laws Implicating the Subject
Matters and Policies of ERISA

With near uniformity, courts have held that ERISA preempts
state laws regulating identical subject matters. Courts have also
generally found that ERISA preempts state laws embodying policies similar to those embodied in ERISA.
1. Identical subject matters in state and federal law- The
clearest cases for preemption are those in which a state seeks to
regulate a matter federal law has already addressed. In Alessi v.
Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc.,"2 for example, the Supreme Court
considered whether employers could, contrary to New Jersey
law, reduce pension benefits by amounts of workers' compensation awards for which retirees were eligible. The Court determined that the Congress that enacted ERISA contemplated and
"embraced" this type of pension benefit computation method. 3
New Jersey sought to bar its use with a statute that "applie[d]
directly to this calculation technique.' 4 As the Court observed,
one "need not determine the outer bounds of ERISA's pre-emptive language to find this New Jersey provision an impermissible
39. Id. at 100 n.21.
40. 105 S. Ct. at 2389.
41. On the other hand, it has been argued that the Court signaled the opposite intention in dicta asserting that a law that regulates "only" an insurer, or the way in which it
may sell insurance, necessarily cannot "relate to" a benefit plan under § 514(a). Id. at
2390. See Sasso v. Vachris, 66 N.Y.2d 28, 494 N.Y.S.2d 856, 484 N.E.2d 1359 (1985),
discussed infra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
42. 451 U.S. 504 (1981).
43. Id. at 517-21.
44. Id. at 524-25.
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intrusion on the federal regulatory scheme."4' 5 Where Congress
dealt with a specific issue concerning pension plans, it could not
have also intended to preserve a regulatory role for the states
concerning that same issue.
Similarly, in Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes,46 California
sought to regulate funding, disclosure, sales practices, and service quality in the delivery of health care services, including delivery through employee benefit health care plans. ERISA, of
course, covered some of these same issues.47 Not surprisingly,
the district court wasted no time analyzing whether section 514
preempted the California law, stating simply that such a conclu' '48
sion was "indisputable.
Alessi and Hewlett-Packard deal with state laws aimed specifically at employee benefit plans and regulation of subject matters that ERISA specifically addresses. Adopting analogous reasoning, the Third Circuit in Hotel and Restaurant Employees
9 held that
and Bartenders InternationalLocal 54 v. Danziger"
New Jersey was powerless to exclude ex-convicts from responsible positions in casino-related union benefit plans because section 411 of ERISA 50 already provides for such exclusions.5 1
45. Id. at 525 (footnote omitted).
46. 425 F. Supp. 1294 (N.D. Cal. 1977), af'd per curiam, 571 F.2d 502 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 831 (1978).
47. See, e.g., ERISA § 2(b), (c), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b), (c) (1982).
48. 425 F. Supp. at 1300.
49. 709 F.2d 815 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 104 S. Ct. 3179 (1984).
50. 29 U.S.C. § 1111 (1982).
51. The state statute in question excluded disqualified individuals from positions
with unions whose affiliates administer pension or welfare funds. This decision makes
ERISA § 514(a) seem like the public policy equivalent of shooting oneself in the foot.
The purpose of the state law in this case was to ensure that the recently legalized New
Jersey casinos would not be taken over by organized crime. Prior to the Third Circuit
decision in Danziger, the Wall Street Journal had reported that "to date at least, the
most detailed information about the alleged links of criminal organizations with union
health-care systems has emerged from the legwork of state crime commissions." Penn,
Organized Crime Finds Rich Pickings in Rise of Union Health Plans,Wall St. J., Oct. 5,
1982, at 1, col. 6. It does not seem plausible that the drafters of ERISA intended to foist
upon the Departments of Labor and Treasury the serious law-enforcement burdens regarding organized crime previously shouldered, in part, by the states.
Moreover, the district court that was reversed by Danziger stated, "We need not question at this juncture that the regulation of gambling is a matter 'deeply rooted in local
feeling and responsibility.' . . . We have already discussed the historical reason why
gambling has been considered anathema in the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions
unless it has been subject to strict control." 536 F. Supp. 317, 331 (D.N.J. 1982).
The New Jersey Supreme Court, addressing a similar measure aimed at curbing infiltration by organized crime into longshoremen's unions operating in the Port of New
York, observed that so long as criminals had run such organizations, "'gambling, the
narcotics traffic, loan sharking, short-ganging, payroll "phantoms," the "shakedown" in
all its forms-and the brutal ultimate of murder-have flourished, often virtually un-
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Other state laws, such as those governing contract rights and fiduciary responsibilities, may directly affect benefit plans without
specifically naming them. Such laws clearly affect aspects of employee benefit plans that ERISA specifically regulates, and section 514(a) preempts them for the same reasons that it preempted the laws at issue in Alessi, Danziger, and HewlettPackard.5 1 Consistent with this view, at least one court held that
checked'" among the longshoremen. Local 1804, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Waterfront Comm'n, 85 N.J. 606, 611, 428 A.2d 1283, 1286 (1981) (citation omitted). "Removing criminal elements from the waterfront in New York and New Jersey," said the court,
was thus "a peculiarly local problem in which each state has a compelling interest." Id.
at 613, 428 A.2d at 1287 (emphasis added).
52. See Blau v. Del Monte Corp., 748 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 106 S.
Ct. 183 (1985) (where employees seek severance pay under plan of former parent of employer, upon sale of their employer by former parent, ERISA preempts state law theories
of liability based on breach of contract, fraud and deceit, breach of contract implied in
fact, promissory estoppel, and estoppel by conduct); Pabst Brewing Co. v. Anger, 610 F.
Supp. 214 (D. Minn. 1985) (where employer sold its brewery to another company ERISA
preempts parties' contract claims arising out of denials of severance pay to brewery employees retained under new ownership); Adcock v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 616 F.
Supp. 409 (M.D. Tenn. 1985) (similar facts and holding); Holland v. Burlington Indus.,
772 F.2d 1140 (4th Cir. 1985), petition for cert. filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3412 (U.S. Nov. 29,
1985) (No. 85-929) (where employer sold a division as a going concern and division employees were retained by buyer, ERISA preempts state-law contract action by employees
against seller for severance pay under seller's severance pay plan); Anderson v. CibaGeigy Corp., 608 F. Supp. 668 (N.D. Ga. 1984), aff'd, 759 F.2d 1518 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 410 (1985) (similar facts and holding); Barry v. Dymo Graphic Sys.,
Inc., 394 Mass. 830, 478 N.E.2d 707 (1985) (similar facts and holding); Musto v. American Gen. Corp., 615 F. Supp. 1483, 1494 (M.D. Tenn. 1985) (in dispute over employer's
right to unilaterally terminate or reduce retirees' benefits, ERISA preempts state law
claims for misrepresentation and breach of contract); Shaw v. International Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers Pension Plan, 563 F. Supp. 653 (C.D. Cal. 1983), aff'd,
750 F.2d 1458 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2678 (1985) (in dispute over plan's right
to phase out cost-of-living adjustments in existing retirees' benefits, ERISA preempts
state law breach of contract claim against plan, employer, and trustees); Retail Shoe
Health Comm'n v. Reminick, 62 N.Y.2d 173, 464 N.E.2d 974, 476 N.Y.S.2d 276 (1984),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2034 (1985) (ERISA preempts state law claims against plan accountants and consultants for breach of fiduciary duties in failure to prevent misconduct
by trustees); Hollenbeck v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 605 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Mo. 1984)
(ERISA preempts state law claim that failure to pay benefits under plan is tortious
breach of fiduciary duty); Lucash v. Strick Corp., 602 F. Supp. 430 (E.D. Pa. 1984)
(ERISA preempts state law claim by unsuccessful benefit claimant for breaches of duty
of care, fiduciary duty, and/or contractual obligations); Nolan v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 588
F. Supp. 1375 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (ERISA preempts state law breach of contract claim
against insurer of employer for denied benefits under welfare benefit plan); Brown v.
Retirement Comm. of Briggs & Stratton Retirement Plan, 575 F. Supp. 1073 (E.D. Wis.
1983) (ERISA preempts state law breach of contract claim for benefits denied under
ERISA plan); Ovitz v. Jefferies & Co., 574 F. Supp. 488 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (in dispute over
amount of benefits due participant on termination of employment, ERISA preempts
state law theories of plan liability based on breach of contract and breach of fiduciary
duty); Felts v. Graphic Arts Employee Benefit Trust, 680 S.W.2d 891 (Tex. Ct. App.
1984) (ERISA preempts all state law claims against plan for failure to pay promised
benefits); Hepler v. CBS, Inc., 39 Wash. App. 838, 696 P.2d 596 (holding that ERISA
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ERISA preempts any state cause of action for tortious interference with an employee benefit plan. 53 Regardless of whether
such a state cause of action could be said to further ERISA's
overall goals, ERISA preempts it, stated one court, because section 51054 provides its own remedies for such interference. 5 Numerous courts have held that state claims for wrongful termination of employment may be barred when termination is intended
to deprive employees of plan benefits, because section 510 of
ERISA also reaches such conduct.56 The Seventh Circuit has unsurprisingly held that "state restitution law and equitable principles" may not be used to extend ERISA's remedies for mistaken contributions to pension plans. 57 Other courts have held
that state law on unjust enrichment may not be invoked to prevent reversions of assets to employers otherwise permitted by
58
section 4044 of ERISA.
preempts breach of contract claim under state Consumer Protection Act in dispute over
disability benefits), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 343 (1985). See also Vermeer v. Bunyard, 72
Or. App. 79, 695 P.2d 57 (1985) (state law regarding attorney's fees preempted by ERISA
where fees relate to actions to enforce contributions to plans; ERISA has its own fee
provisions).
53. See Dependahl v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 653 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1084 (1981).
54. 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1982).
55. Dependahl, 653 F.2d at 1215-16.
56. Miner v. International Typographical Union Negotiated Pension Plan, 601 F.
Supp. 1390 (D. Colo. 1985); Baker v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 608 F. Supp.
1315 (N.D. Cal. 1984); Folz v. Marriott Corp., 594 F. Supp. 1007 (W.D. Mo. 1984); King
v. James River-Pepperell, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1344 (D. Mass. 1984); Delisi v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 580 F. Supp. 1572 (W.D. Pa. 1984); Gordon v. Matthew Bender & Co., 562
F. Supp. 1286 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Maxfield v. Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Health, Welfare and Pension Funds, 559 F. Supp. 158 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
57. Martin v. Hamil, 608 F.2d 725, 729-30 (7th Cir. 1979).
58. Bryant v. International Fruit Products Co., 604 F. Supp. 890 (S.D. Ohio 1985);
District 65, UAW v. Harper & Row Publishers, 576 F. Supp. 1468 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); UAW
v. Dyneer Corp., 4 E.B.C. 1486 (N.D. Ohio 1983), aff'd per curiam, 747 F.2d 335 (6th Cir.
1984). See also California Chamber of Commerce v. Simpson, 601 F. Supp. 104 (C.D.
Cal. 1985) (stating that § 514(a) prevents the state Labor Commission from investigating, holding hearings on, and taking assignment of severance benefit claims); Azzaro v.
Harnett, 414 F. Supp. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), afl'd mem., 553 F.2d 93 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 824 (1977) (stating that § 514(a) prevents New York State Insurance Department from investigating a participant's pension benefit status); Cornell Mfg. Co. v.
Mushlin, 70 A.D.2d 123, 131, 420 N.Y.S.2d 231, 237 (1979) (holding that ERISA
preempts any state cause of action based on an allegation that plan trustees wrongfully
permitted a participant to take pension benefits in a lump sum). But see Provience v.
Valley Clerks Trust Fund, 509 F. Supp. 388, 391-92 (E.D. Cal. 1981) (holding that
ERISA does not preempt state law claims of fraudulent misrepresentation; failure, in
bad faith, to pay a legitimate claim for benefits; and intentional infliction of emotional
distress, because they arise under laws of "general application which [pertain] to an area
of ['classically'] important state concern" and which have "only an indirect effect on the
plan.") It is difficult to reconcile Provience with the purposes and trend of authority
under § 514. California's state courts have apparently declined to accept the authority of
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2. Similar policies, different subject matters in state and
federal law- The case for preemption under the language of
section 514(a) is nearly as clear when the state law at issue, although without a strict parallel in ERISA, is yet clearly motivated, as is ERISA, by concern for employees' pension or welfare
benefits. For example, preemption is certainly called for by the
statute when state law purports to regulate the content of employee benefit plans, even though ERISA is silent as to plan content. This reasoning is laid out clearly in Standard Oil Co. v.
Agsalud,5e which held that ERISA preempted a Hawaii statute
that required employers to provide employees with health insurance that covered, among other things, treatment for alcohol
and drug abuse. The state argued unsuccessfully that section
514 need not be interpreted as ruling out state regulation of this
kind because the two statutes are complementary: ERISA regulated administrative aspects of welfare benefit plans, while the
state law at issue regulated plan contents. ° As the Ninth Circuit
noted in affirming the district court, however, there is nothing in
section 514(a) to support "a distinction between the state laws
relating to benefits as opposed to administration.""
There are at least two reasons, beyond the face of section 514,
why "complementarity" of the kind rejected in this case seems
inconsistent with section 514. First, the interpretation proffered
this decision. Provience v. Valley Clerks Trust Fund, 163 Cal. App. 3d 249, 209 Cal.
Rptr. 276 (1984). See infra Part II.B.3.a.
59. 442 F. Supp. 695 (N.D. Cal. 1977), aff'd, 633 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1980), aff'd mem.,
454 U.S. 801 (1981).
60.
Insofar as the Hawaii Act does not regulate matters covered by ERISA (basically
reporting, disclosure, funding, vesting, and fiduciary duties), it would not, under
this interpretation, be superseded because it does not relate to employee benefit
plans in any of the ways that ERISA relates to employee benefit plans." ERISA
and the Hawaii Act would be complementary, each occupying part of a field not
occupied by the other. Under this interpretation, Hawaiian workers would obtain the protection of both the Hawaii Act, which regulates benefits but not administration, and ERISA, which regulates administration but not benefits. However wise Congress might have been to take this approach to preemption of state
laws regulating employee benefit plans, Congress clearly rejected it.
11. Any argument that a state law concerning the same subject matter as
ERISA does not "relate to" employee benefit plans within the meaning of
§ 514(a) is unsupportable. As the evolution of the language of the preemption
clause (see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes, supra, 425 F. Supp. at 1298 & nn.
13-14) unequivocally shows, that section was intended at the very least to preempt state laws regulating disclosure, reporting, vesting, funding, and fiduciary
duties of plan administrators.
442 F. Supp. at 706-07 (emphasis added).
61. 633 F.2d at 765.
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by Hawaii would have rendered meaningless the change in section 514 that the conference committee made prior to the enactment of ERISA in 1974. The very purpose of that change was to
expand the ambit of section 514 beyond "perimeters of preemption [defined] in relation to the areas regulated by the bill." 2
Second, where benefit plans emerge from collective bargaining, there is a federal interest, reflected in federal labor law preemption doctrines, in precluding state interference with labormanagement negotiations. An ERISA preemption policy that restricts "complementary" state legislation can arguably serve this
federal interest. This argument, however, has its limits. Some
state laws that neither discourage nor encourage collective bargaining, including laws mandating minimum benefits under insured benefit plans, are not preempted under the federal labor
laws.63
Of course, had section 514 never been enacted, and had the
courts resorted solely to judicial preemption tests in Agsalud,
the factors bearing on whether the Hawaii Act was preempted
would have been completely different. As Part III will discuss,
the holding in Agsalud generated congressional concern over the
apparently "inadvertent" reach of section 514(a). Yet, the reasoning of the courts in Agsalud was quite compelling. Generalizing the holding of Alessi, the Second Circuit observed: "A state
statute that eliminates from ERISA-covered employee benefit
plans features that are [silently] permitted by federal law is preempted." 4 Courts have applied these principles in cases involving miscellaneous state law requirements applicable to employee
benefit plans. 66 As one common example, numerous courts have
62. 120 CONG. REC. 29,942 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Javits).
63. Compare Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 105 S. Ct. 2380 (1985)
(holding that state law mandating minimum mental health care coverage under insurance policies purchased by collectively bargained plans is not preempted by ERISA or
the National Labor Relations Act), with Alessi, 451 U.S. at 525 (stating that the federal
interest in precluding state interference with labor-management negotiations calls for
preemption of state efforts to regulate the terms of collectively bargained plans).
64. Delta Air Lines v. Kramarsky, 666 F.2d 21, 25 (2d Cir. 1981), aff'd sub nom. Shaw
v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85 (1983) (stating that § 514(a) preempts state law requiring
that employee benefit plans provide coverage for disability due to pregnancy on the same
basis on which other disabling conditions are covered).
65. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Burlington Indus., 765 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1985) (stating that
§ 514(a) preempts state law and administrative order requiring payment of "wage supplements" in the form of severance pay), appeals docketed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3179 (U.S. Sept.
16, 1985) (Nos. 85-441 & 85-460); Champion Int'l Corp. v. Brown, 731 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir.
1984) (stating that § 514(a) preempts state administrative order requiring employer to
give credit toward pension for years of service performed after age 65); California Chamber of Commerce v. Simpson, 601 F. Supp. 104 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (stating that § 514(a)
preempts state laws and administrative manual insofar as they regulate severance pay
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held preempted state statutes that simply enforce contractual
obligations to make contributions to pension or welfare benefit
plans, even where the state law imposes criminal penalties for
failure to meet these obligations.66 Although ERISA does not
cover the same ground as these statutes, courts have generally
had no trouble finding that they "relate to" ERISA-covered
plans. One notable exception, however, is the New York Court of
Appeals, which recently held in Sasso v. Vachris6 7 that a state
statute making shareholders liable for the debts of corporations
to (among others) employee benefit plans68 does not relate to
such plans because it does not regulate their terms or
conditions.6 9
and severance pay disputes); Northwest Airlines v. Gomez-Bethke, No. 4-83-773 (D.
Minn. April 1, 1984) (stating that § 514(a) preempts state administrative order requiring
employer to provide ordinary sick leave or medical benefits for absences due to treatment of alcoholism); California Hosp. Ass'n v. Henning, 569 F. Supp. 1544 (C.D. Cal.
1983) (stating that § 514(a) preempts state law requiring employers to pay discharged
employees vested vacation pay under ERISA-covered vacation plans), rev'd on other
grounds, 770 F.2d 856 (9th Cir. 1985); Dawson v. Whaland, 529 F. Supp. 626 (D.N.H.
1982) (stating that § 514(a) preempts state law requiring group accident and health plan
benefits to be extended to any beneficiary who otherwise would become ineligible for
extended periods of time); Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp. v. Ilsley, 518 F. Supp. 1297 (D.
Conn. 1981) (stating that § 514(a) preempts state law requiring employers to contribute
to employee welfare funds while the employee is receiving or is eligible for workers' compensation), aff'd, 690 F.2d 323 (2d Cir. 1982), aff'd mem., 463 U.S. 1220 (1983); St. Paul
Elec. Workers Welfare Fund v. Markman, 490 F. Supp. 931 (D. Minn. 1980) (stating that
§ 514(a) preempts state laws mandating that (a) health benefit plans provide certain
conversion benefits, and (b) such plans contribute to a state-wide risk-sharing plan);
General Split Corp. v. Mitchell, 523 F. Supp. 427 (E.D. Wis. 1981) (similar facts and
holding). Cf. Blue Cross and Blue Shield v. Peacock's Apothecary, Inc., 567 F. Supp.
1258, 1276 (N.D. Ala. 1983) (state law regulating all "third party prescription programs,"
including "employee benefit plans," relates to plans and is preempted by § 514(a)). Blue
Cross v. Cannon, 589 F. Supp. 1483 (D.R.I. 1984), involves an arguably preempted state
law requiring every employee health benefit plan to offer participants the option of
membership in a health maintenance organization; the decision withholds consideration
of the preemption question, however, for jurisdictional reasons.
66. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Burlington Indus., 765 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1985); Trustees of
Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n Prod. Workers' Welfare Fund v. Aberdeen Blower and
Sheet Metal Workers, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 561 (E.D.N.Y. 1983); Baker v. Caravan Moving
Corp., 561 F. Supp. 337 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Calhoon v. Bonnabel, 560 F. Supp. 101
(S.D.N.Y. 1982); Plumbers Local Union No. 93 Health & Welfare Pension Fund v.
Water-Men Plumbing Corp., No. 84-C-1439 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 4, 1985); Commonwealth v.
Federico, 383 Mass. 485, 419 N.E.2d 1374 (1981).
67. 66 N.Y.2d 28, 494 N.Y.S.2d 856, 484 N.E.2d 1359 (1985). See also Sasso v. Millbrook Enters., Inc., 108 Misc. 2d 562, 438 N.Y.S.2d 59 (Sup. Ct. 1981); Courtney v.
Brooklyn & Queens Allied Oil Burner Corp., 112 Misc. 2d 89, 446 N.Y.S.2d 157 (Civ. Ct.
1981); Goldstein v. Mangano, 99 Misc. 2d 523, 417 N.Y.S.2d 368 (Civ. Ct. 1978). These
lower court decisions were overruled, on non-ERISA grounds, by Stoganovic v. Dinolfo,
92 App. Div. 2d 729, 461 N.Y.S.2d 121 (1983), aff'd, 61 N.Y.2d 812, 473 N.Y.S.2d 972,
462 N.E.2d 149 (1984).
68. N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 630 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1984).
69. There are a number of problems with the rationale of this decision, created as
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State Laws Implementing Policies Outside the Scope of
ERISA

The reasoning that dictates section 514(a) preemption in Agsalud and some of the other cases involving "complementary"
state regulation,"0 can sometimes be as compelling as the reasoning of cases like Alessi. As the "core" policies behind state and
federal laws are distinguished, however, and especially as the
former ascend in importance, the temptation becomes great to
conclude that Congress did not intend to preempt the state law
in question, absent an explicit reference to it. A presumption
that seems to be firmly entrenched is "that the historic police
powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal
Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." 7' 1 In some contexts, courts have been willing to conclude,
despite the broad and explicit language of section 514, that it
does not express "the clear and manifest purpose of Congress"
to supersede certain "historic police powers of the States," even
insofar as they relate to employee benefit plans.7 2
Such an approach arguably might not save state law from preemption in a case like Agsalud. In that case, the state law requiring certain welfare plans to provide for alcohol and drug
abuse treatment could be viewed as an outgrowth of concerns
similar to those that spawned ERISA. ERISA created standards
of disclosure and fiduciary conduct with respect to employee
benefit plans, and the state law at issue in Agsalud created
standards of coverage for such plans. Each was undoubtedly enmuch by ERISA as by the court's misinterpretation of § 514. It would be fair to characterize the state law at issue in Sasso as simply a device for piercing the corporate veil in
ordinary contract actions to enforce employee benefit plans. One would have hoped that
such a device would have been available, in appropriate circumstances, under federal as
well as state contract law involving employee benefit plans, although such devices are
sometimes more appropriately created by statute than by judge-made "common law,"
and ERISA has no provisions directed to this issue. However, if Sasso was simply a suit
to enforce the terms of a plan, the court treated the suit incorrectly wholly apart from
the preemption issue. Had the court acted properly, it would have dismissed the case as
coming within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts. See ERISA § 502(a)(3)(A),
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(A) (1982). The court also erred in emphasizing its reliance on the
supposed rule that § 514(a) only preempts state laws that regulate plan "terms and conditions." This questionable reading of the statute is really no more helpful in resolving
the issues in Sasso than are the words of § 514(a) themselves.
70. See supra text accompanying notes 59-66.
71. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
72. See, e.g., Stone v. Stone, 450 F. Supp. 919 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (ERISA does not
preempt state laws under which ex-spouses may garnish pension payments), af'd, 632
F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 922 (1981).
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acted primarily because, as Congress found, such plans "have
become an important factor affecting the stability of employment and the successful development of industrial relations," as
well as "the continued well-being and security of millions of em7' 3
ployees and their dependents.
The contents of plans, however, may also be dictated by the
application of principles that were adopted for quite different
purposes. Laws against sex discrimination provide a significant
example. In Gast v. State7 the Oregon Court of Appeals went so
far as to hold that state civil rights laws that dictate the pregnancy-related content of benefit plans are not covered by section
514(a), stating: "We decline to make such a broad interpretation
in the absence of any legislative declaration that Congress intended to create an enormous regulatory vacuum in areas that
traditionally have been matters of vital state concern. ' 75 In its
7
Gast rereasoning, if not its result, the Gast case is uniquee.
sponded to a policy concern that was vindicated by identical results in almost every other court outside the Second Circuit until Shaw v. Delta Air Lines77 was decided; however, those other
courts specifically declined to hold that such civil rights laws did
not "relate to" plans within the meaning of section 514(a).78
73. ERISA § 2(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1982).
74. 36 Or. App. 441, 585 P.2d 12 (1978).
75. Id. at 458, 585 P.2d at 23.
76. But see Electrical Workers, Local No. 1 Credit Union v. IBEW-NECA Holiday
Trust Fund, 583 S.W.2d 154, 159 (Mo. 1979) (ERISA does not preempt garnishment of
welfare benefit plans: "We believe the approach taken by the court in Gast is persuasive."). Generally, of course, most courts reject Gast's premise that "there is no indication in any of the legislative history of an intent to preempt areas of state regulation
which are not addressed by ERISA." Gast, 36 Or. App. at 458, 585 P.2d at 23.
77. 463 U.S. 85 (1983). See infra note 78.
78. Prior to Shaw, almost all courts had agreed that § 514(a) reached state sex discrimination laws that dictated benefit plan contents. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp.
v. Maryland Comm'n on Human Relations, 520 F. Supp. 539, 546 (D. Md. 1981). However, each of these cases raised an issue under § 514(d), namely, whether preemption of
such laws would impair federal laws prohibiting sex discrimination. Most courts held
that it would, and that such laws were accordingly saved from preemption by § 514(d).
See, e.g., Bucyrus-Erie Co. v. Department of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 599 F.2d
205 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1031 (1980). Contra Delta Air Lines v. Kramarsky, 666 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1981), aff'd sub nom. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85
(1983); Pervel Indus. v. Connecticut Comm'n on Human Rights & Opportunities, 468 F.
Supp. 490 (D. Conn. 1978), aff'd mem., 603 F.2d 214 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1031 (1980); International Ladies' Garment Workers' Local 111 v. Human Relations
Comm'n, 53 Pa. Commw. 229, 417 A.2d 1279 (1980).
The § 514(d) issue raised considerably more controversy than the § 514(a) issues. It is
interesting to speculate how the courts in these cases would have construed § 514(a) had
they not seen § 514(d) as an available safety valve. In 1980 the Supreme Court appeared
arguably to have bound the lower courts to the Bucyrus-Erie view with its summary
dispositions of Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Commissioner of Labor & Indus., 445
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The understandable judicial inclination to reconcile section
514 with statutes responding to policies originating outside the
employee benefits concerns of ERISA becomes greater when the
applicable state laws are "of general application" and do-not
purport to govern employee benefit plans as such. In such cases
courts, including the Supreme Court, speak of "remote," "peripheral," and "tangential" relations between state law and benefit plans,79 or of laws "which affect employee benefit plans but
which do not relate to them within the meaning of § 514(a)." 80
In such cases, however, it sometimes appears that the intensity
of the state interest, rather than its "remoteness" from benefit
plans, determines whether courts will hold that section 514(a)
expresses a "clear and manifest [preemptive] purpose."81
1. Intra-familial support- The nearly uniform conclusion
of the courts prior to the Retirement Equity Act of 198482 was
that the state has a sufficiently strong interest in the property
and support rights of spouses and children to save laws that preserve such rights from ERISA preemption. 83 As discussed in
Part III.B below, the Retirement Equity Act codified this result.
Even prior to this legislative event, however, courts had held
that a pension plan could be garnished in state court in -order to
satisfy the claim of a beneficiary's ex-wife to alimony or child
support, despite section 514(a).84 Stone v. Stone, 5 perhaps the
U.S. 921 (1980), and Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Minnesota, 444 U.S. 1041 (1980),
each of which dismissed an appeal, for want of a substantial federal question, from a
state court decision adopting the Bucyrus-Erie interpretation. See also United Fed'n of
Teachers Welfare Fund v. State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 449 U.S. 803 (1980). Shaw,
however, overruled the Bucyrus-Erie line of decisions, and held that, notwithstanding
§ 514(d), ERISA preempts state laws insofar as they mandate employee pregnancy benefits which can lawfully be denied under federal antidiscrimination law.
79. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 100 n.21.
80. Stone v. Stone, 450 F. Supp. 919, 932 (1978). The remarks of Rep. Dent indicated, on the other hand, that "relate to" in § 514 meant nothing less than "affect":
The conferees, with the narrow exceptions specifically enumerated, applied
this principle in its broadest sense to foreclose any non-Federal regulation of
employee benefit plans. Thus, the provisions of section 514 would reach any rule,
regulation, practice or decision of any State, subdivision thereof or any agency or
instrumentality thereof-including any professional society or association operating under color of law-which would affect any employee benefit plan as described in section 4(a) and not exempt under section 4(b).
120 CONG. REc. 29,197 (1974) (emphasis added). Unless Dent was wrong, the Stone formulation is a semantic exercise that empties the statute's words of useful meaning.
81. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
82. Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426 (1984). For a discussion of the effect of the
Retirement Equity Act on employee benefit plans, see infra Part III.B.
83. See generally Caples, ERISA, Preemption and California Community Property
Law, 22 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 33 (1982); Note, ERISA Preemption of State Law: The
Meaning of "Relate to" in Section 514, 58 WASH. U.L.Q. 143, 146 n.16, 157-61 (1980).
84. See, e.g., Operating Eng'rs' Local 428 Pension Trust Fund v. Zamborsky, 650
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leading case in this field, held as did other later decisions"6 that
pension plan funds could be garnished to satisfy a state court
judgment that a monthly pension payment is part of the beneficiary's ex-wife's share of their community property. Another
court held that a plan could be ordered to pay available benefits
to an ex-spouse to satisfy a plan of property distribution, even
where the employee had not yet elected to begin receiving payments.8 7 Even though a beneficiary made specific provision for
payment of his interest in a pension plan upon his death, the
state law of community property could be invoked, said yet another court, to redirect part of his interest to his widow.88
In these cases involving the intersection of federal pension law
and state family law, courts invoked several arguments to avoid
preemption. First, courts recognized the enhanced importance of
state, as opposed to federal regulation of family matters.8 9 Second, courts recognized that discharge of familial support obligations is a private function of direct significance to federal and
state treasuries, for the alternative to spousal support may be
F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1981); American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Merry, 592 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1979);
Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Parr, 480 F. Supp. 924
(E.D. Mich. 1979); Senco of Fla., Inc. v. Clark, 473 F. Supp. 902 (M.D. Fla. 1979).
85. 450 F. Supp. 919 (N.D. Cal. 1978), aff'd, 632 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 922 (1981).
86. See Carpenters Pension Trust Fund v. Campa, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980), dismissing
appeal, for want of substantialfederal question, from In re Marriage of Campa, 89 Cal.
App. 3d 113, 152 Cal. Rptr. 362 (1979); Carpenters Pension Trust v. Kronschnabel, 632
F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 922 (1981). Cf. General Motors Corp. v.
Townsend, 468 F. Supp. 466 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (although ERISA § 514(a) does not preempt state law of garnishment, ERISA § 206(d) prevents divorced wife, who is entitled
to half of ex-husband's pension pursuant to state court decrees, from obtaining garnishment against ERISA plan trustee).
87. Savings and Profit Sharing Fund of Sears Employees v. Gago, 717 F.2d 1038 (7th
Cir. 1983).
88. Employees Say. Plan of Mobil Oil Corp. v. Geer, 535 F. Supp. 1052 (S.D.N.Y.
1982); cf. United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting
Indus. Local 198 Pension Plan v. Myers, 488 F. Supp. 704 (M.D. La. 1980), aff'd on other
grounds, 645 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that state law of community property may
be invoked to redirect interest to decedent's ex-spouse).
89.
Insofar as marriage is within temporal control, the States lay on the guiding
hand. "The whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent
and child, belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United
On the rare occasion
States." In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-594 (1890) ....
when state family law has come into conflict with a federal statute, the Court
has limited review under the Supremacy Clause to a determination whether
Congress has "positively required by direct enactment" that state law be preA mere conflict in words is not sufficient. State family and familyempted ....
property law must do "major damage" to "clear and substantial" federal interests before the Supremacy Clause will demand that state law be overridden.
Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979) (citations omitted).
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public welfare.90
Third, Congress designed ERISA with the aim of protecting
not only beneficiaries, but their dependents as well."' Moreover,
were ERISA to insulate the employee from his obligations to his
nonemployee ex-spouse, the latter would retain no offsetting opportunities to replace the loss. By contrast, when ERISA preempted the state laws at issue in Alessi and Hewlett-Packard,it
deprived employees of certain state-mandated terms that could
theoretically be recouped through the process of collective bargaining. The nonemployee ex-spouse has no ability to guarantee
his or her rights to support through collective bargaining; nor
can he or she recoup the loss of state law protection by other
means without perverting the incentives surrounding the institution of marriage itself.92
Fourth, both of the agencies charged with administering
ERISA, Treasury and Labor, interpreted ERISA as not preempting state laws of family property and support.9 3 The views
of Treasury and Labor in interpreting section 514(a) in this re90. See, e.g., American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Merry, 592 F.2d 118, 124-25 (2d Cir. 1979).
In rejecting the argument that enforcement of state-ordered support payments would
result in unanticipated increases in pension plan administration costs, the Second Circuit replied, that: "[In our view, any increased administration costs must be regarded as
a slight consideration when balanced against the heavy burden that will be imposed on
the public treasury if dependent spouses and children cannot enforce support rights and
must instead resort to welfare assistance." Id. at 125 (footnote omitted).
91. In ERISA § 2(a), Congress found "that the continued well-being and security of
millions of employees and their dependents are directly affected by [employee benefit]
plans. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1982) (emphasis added). As Judge Renfrew remarked in
Stone v. Stone, "[ult would be ironic indeed if a provision designed in part to ensure that
an employee spouse would be able to meet his obligations to family after retirement were
interpreted to permit him to evade them with impunity after divorce." 450 F. Supp. at
926. This argument, however, appears to cut more strongly the other way. If the drafters
of ERISA were already cognizant of the needs of employees' dependents, yet wished to
"preempt the entire field" in which they were legislating, see 120 CONG. REc. 29,933
(1974) (remarks of Sen. Williams), then it is reasonable to believe that they included
within ERISA itself all measures deemed necessary to protect family members.
92.
The insulation by ERISA of a substantial community asset from her community
property claims if the marriage ends in divorce should not lead the nonemployee
spouse to anticipate (and perhaps precipitate) that event by limiting her contributions to the marital partnership. The right of an employee to collect a pension
from a plan covered by ERISA should encourage, not discourage, a prospective
spouse to marry him.
e
Stone, 450 F. Supp. at 926.
93. See American Tel. & Tel., 592 F.2d at 125. In this context as in others, "[c]ourts
must respect 'the interpretation given the statute by the officers or agency charged with
its administration,' particularly when the interpretation is made contemporaneously with
the enactment of the statute." Standard Oil Co. v. Agsalud, 442 F. Supp. 695, 705 (N.D.
Cal. 1977) (quoting Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965)), affd, 633 F.2d 760 (9th Cir.
1980), aff'd mem., 454 U.S. 801 (1981).
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spect are entitled to "important but not controlling significance."9 Needless to say, however, these agencies, like the
courts, sometimes take positions based more on notions of desirable public policy than on the actual language or intent of the
statute.
Finally, children and ex-spouses who are entitled to overdue
support payments arguably need immediate protection in the
form of judge-made exceptions to otherwise clear legislative pronouncements. Despite Congress's undoubtedly sincere intention
to review and modify section 514 "[i]f it is determined that the
preemption policy devised has the effect of precluding essential
regulation at . . .the State . . .level," 95 most courts cannot be
expected to throw support case plaintiffs on the mercy of the
legislative process.
2. State laws with minimal impact on employee benefit
plans- Other types of cases illustrate that state laws can be of
such peripheral import to employee benefit plans as to rightfully
escape preemption under almost any analysis. For example, the
Ninth Circuit in Lane v. Goren9" held that benefit plan trusts, in
their capacity as employers, must observe state laws against racial and age discrimination just as all other employers must. At
least three courts have held that minority stockholders may invoke traditional state corporate fiduciary law against the majority stockholders even if the defendants have used the establishment of, contributions to, or withdrawals from, employee benefit
plans as a means of depriving the complaining stockholders of
their corporate rights.97 The New York Court of Appeals has
opined in dictum that although ERISA may preempt the "regulation of union prepaid legal services plans, qua plans," it "does
not reach the professional licensure and regulation of lawyers,
'
qua lawyers, who would render legal services under the plans."
94. See Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 424 (1977).
95. 120 CONG. REC. 29,942 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Javits). See supra note 13.
96. 743 F.2d 1337 (9th Cir. 1984).
97. Goben v. Barry, 237 Kan. 822, 703 P.2d 1378 (1985); Cornell Mfg. Co. v. Mushlin,
70 A.D.2d 123, 420 N.Y.S.2d 231 (1979); Smith v. Crowder Jr. Co., 280 Pa. Super. 626,
421 A.2d 1107 (1980).
98. Feinstein v. Attorney-General, 36 N.Y.2d 199, 205-06, 326 N.E.2d 288, 292, 366
N.Y.S.2d 613, 617-18 (1975). For these purposes, professional regulation of lawyers
means
to assess the authenticity of the plan, to assure its freedom from any taint of
improper professional conduct, to preserve the attorney-client relation, to require full disclosure to prevent fraud or other wrong upon the public, and, above
all, to make sure that future professional conduct on behalf of the ... organizations remains subject to discipjinary control by the Appellate Division ....
Id. at 205, 326 N.E.2d at 291, 366 N.Y.S.2d at 617. Subsequently, the Appellate Division
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This view is in harmony with ERISA's legislative history: "Since
the plans subject to Federal supervision would include plans
providing prepaid legal services, it is intended that State regulation-but not bar association ethical rules, guidelines or disciplinary actions-in regard to such plans be preempted." 9 Presumably, doctors, dentists, and other professionals could render
services as part of employee welfare benefit plans without the
states thereby being stripped of all authority to regulate their
professional conduct.
A recent Second Circuit case demonstrates, however, that
even cases of this type-i.e., cases concerning state regulation of
service providers who count benefit plans among their clientele-can dangerously approach the preempted zone. In Rebaldo
v. Cuomo,1 00 the court ruled that a state statute forbidding hospitals from negotiating discount inpatient charges with self-insured employee benefit plans does not "relate to" such plans. 10 1
The statute at issue established a three-year demonstration project for controlling hospital costs. Each hospital was given an
"inpatient revenue cap" and was required to establish a charge
schedule designed to generate that amount of revenue. Non-governmental payors were required to pay schedule rates unless
they fell into certain enumerated groups, such as certain health
insurers, self-insured groups, and health maintenance organizations. Blue Cross payments were authorized to be made at
twelve to fifteen percent discounts from the schedule.
An employee benefit plan not included in the excepted categories invoked section 514(a) to avoid the prohibition against negotiating discount rates. Because the law was part of a demonstration project undertaken in connection with federal efforts to
contain Medicare costs, the state argued in the district court
that, whether or not the law "related to" a plan, it was not preempted by ERISA because of the federal law savings clause in
section 514(d). This argument did not prevail, and although no
explicit attention was given to the question of whether the law
"related to" the plan, the district court implicitly found that it
did and held the law preempted.
held that ERISA did not preempt such regulation of prepaid legal plans. In re UAW
Legal Servs. Plan, 69 A.D.2d 995, 416 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1979). See generally Pfennigstorf &
Kimball, Employee Legal Service Plans: Conflicts Between Federal and State Regula-

tion, 1976 AM. B.
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99. 120 CONG. REC. 29,949 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Javits).
100. 749 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2702 (1985).
101. Cf. Bonser v. New Jersey, 605 F. Supp. 1227 (D.N.J. 1985) (stating that plaintiff
could not show a reasonable probability of success on a claim that ERISA preempts a
state hospital billing system).
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On appeal, the panel reversed, addressing itself solely to the
section 514(a) issue. 10 2 Rather than rely on the streamlined common-sense Shaw test,103 the court started with the premise that
"[t]he containment of hospital costs is an exercise of a State's
police powers, which should not be superseded by federal regulations unless that was the clear intent of Congress."'" Although
employee health care plans are established to pay for items such
as inpatient hospital care, the court equated that peculiarly important cost of plan operation with the background of civic costs
and constraints-such as obedience to laws against racial discrimination, imposed in Lane v. Goren-faced by all organizations, regardless of purpose. Thus, the court in Rebaldo apparently observed no material distinction between a state's
requirement of compliance with a hospital cost containment law,
on the one hand, and, say, an employment discrimination law on
the other.
3. Other state laws and the breakdown of judicial accordOutside of decisions involving familial support, corporate fiduciary law, and provider regulation, courts have not been as willing
to dismiss preemption arguments based on section 514(a) alone,
without recourse to the savings clauses in sections 514(b) and
514(d). Courts that have upheld state laws without resort to the
savings clauses have not found unanimous support from other
courts addressing the same issues.
a. Fraud- In Provience v. Valley Clerks Trust Fund0 5 an
employee sued a plan and its administrator over their failure to
provide benefits under a health plan. The claims made by the
plaintiff included fraudulent misrepresentation, bad faith refusal
to pay the claim, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
A federal district court hearing the case held that state laws governing fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress are,
like family law, laws of general application responding to state
policies so important that section 514(a) of ERISA does not preempt them, even insofar as they regulate the conduct of plan
administration. This holding could not rely on the same arguments used in the family law context, and the state laws regard102. The author of the opinion indicated that he would have reversed based on the
514(d) issue had it been found that the law did "relate to" the plan. 749 F.2d at 13940.
103. Under this test, "[a] law 'relates to' an employee benefit plan, in the normal
sense of the phrase, if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan." Shaw, 463
U.S. at 96-97 (footnote omitted).
104. 749 F.2d at 138.
105. 509 F. Supp. 388 (E.D. Cal. 1981).

§
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ing misrepresentation at issue in Provience related to the specific "subject matters" of ERISA, thus suggesting that they
should have been preempted on the same grounds set forth in
Alessi. 06 Nevertheless, the federal Provience court reasoned
that ERISA did not preempt these state law claims because they
arose under laws of "general application which pertain to an
area of ['classically'] important state concern" and which had
"only an indirect effect on the plan." 107
The federal court that issued the Provience decision had acquired the case on removal from state court. After all federal
questions were decided in the federal court, the case was remanded to the state court. The latter refused to hear the case,
however, on the ground that ERISA did preempt all of the employee's state-law claims.1 08 This decision to reject the federal
Provience reasoning probably represents the majority view."0 '
Such rejection, however, is not unanimous. As recently as April
1985, a federal district court, citing the federal Provience decision with approval, upheld a state claim alleging that plaintiffs
were fraudulently induced to switch pension plans."'
b. Intentional infliction of emotional harm- The federal
decision in Provience also allowed a state claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. In Kelly v. IBM,1" decided four
months after Shaw, a federal district court found Provience to
106. The court in Provience argued that "[w]illful fraud falls outside the, scope of the
fiduciary regulation provisions of ERISA," 509 F. Supp. at 392, but it is not clear that
this is true, and the state causes of action in Provience were indisputably directed toward regulating the precise subject matters of ERISA-disclosure and fiduciary conduct.
107. 509 F. Supp. at 391.
108. Provience v. Valley Clerks Trust Fund, 163 Cal. App. 3d 249, 209 Cal. Rptr. 276
(1984).
109. See, e.g., Phillips v. Amoco Oil Co., 614 F. Supp. 694, 706-09 (N.D. Ala. 1985)
(holding that § 514 preempts any state claim for fraudulent representations about future
pension benefits of existing employees resulting from sale of the ongoing business for
which those employees work); Justice v. Bankers Trust Co., 607 F. Supp. 527, 530-32
(N.D. Ala. 1985) (holding that § 514 preempts state law claims of fraud and misrepresentation against plan fiduciary premised on alleged suppression of facts fiduciary was obligated to disclose); District 65, UAW v. Harper & Row Publishers, 576 F. Supp. 1468,
1487 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding that § 514(a) preempts common-law claims such as unjust
enrichment, fraud, and conversion in a suit alleging wrongful acts in the termination of
retirement plan); Ogden v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 571 F. Supp. 520, 523 (E.D. Mich.
1983) (expressly rejecting Provience in case alleging employer and plan fiduciary fraudulently induced employees to forego certain pension benefits); Gordon v. Matthew Bender
& Co., 562 F. Supp. 1286, 1293 (N.D. Ill.
1983) (expressly rejecting Provience in case
alleging employee was fired in order to deprive him of pension benefits).
110. Miller v. Lay Trucking Co., 606 F. Supp. 1326 (N.D. Ind. 1985). See also Hepler
v. CBS, Inc., 39 Wash. App. 838, 696 P.2d 596 (holding that state law governs benefit
claimant's punitive damages claim despite § 514(a), and relying on Provience as primary
authority), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 343 (1985).
111. 573 F. Supp. 366 (E.D. Pa. 1983), aff'd mem., 746 F.2d 1467 (3d Cir. 1984).

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 19:1

be correct in this respect, and held that ERISA does not preempt a state law claim that an employer intentionally inflicted
emotional distress through mishandling a claim for disability
benefits. The Kelly decision emphasized that recovery for emotional distress is limited by state law to situations involving "intentionally 'outrageous conduct,'" and that the regulation of
such conduct would affect plans too remotely to warrant preemption. 112 Other courts have held such claims preempted.1 3
c. Discrimination- In Gast v. State,"4 an intermediate
state appellate court upheld a state law governing the content of
pension plans on the ground that it derived from important
state policies against sex discrimination and thus did not "relate
to" employee benefit plans. This appears to be a mistaken view,
and was rejected first by the majority of courts, and eventually
by the Supreme Court in Shaw.1 1 5 Like state laws governing tort
and contract, state regulation of sex discrimination, regardless of
its importance, cannot be supported with the same powerful arguments as state regulation of family property rights. Antidiscrimination laws in this country are as traditionally rooted in
national policy as in "local feeling and responsibility." Nor is a
state law requiring a welfare benefit plan provision merely
"peripheral."
Other cases have addressed the problem of applying state age
discrimination laws to ERISA plans, and have found that such
laws "relate to" employee benefit plans. For example, in Champion International Corp. v. Brown," 6 the Ninth Circuit held
112. Id. at 371. Cf. Witkowski v. St. Anne's Hosp. of Chicago, Inc., 113 Ill. App. 3d
745, 447 N.E.2d 1016 (1983) (addressing on its merits, based on state cases, a claim that
discharge to deprive employee of disability benefits amounted to intentional infliction of
emotional distress). It is notable that the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29
U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982), does not preempt state law actions for intentional infliction of
emotional distress arising out of conduct which might also form the basis for unfair labor
practice charges before the National Labor Relations Board. Farmer v. United Bhd. of
Carpenters, Local 25, 430 U.S. 290 (1977). The NLRA would ordinarily preempt such an
action if it did not fall within the exception stated in the Garmon case. See supra text
accompanying note 30. In Farmer the Court stated that, to escape preemption, it is essential that the state tort be either unrelated to the specific unfair labor practice charge
or be "a function of the particularlyabusive manner" in which the unfair labor practice
is accomplished or threatened. 430 U.S. at 305 (emphasis added).
113. See, e.g., Russell v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co., 722 F.2d 482, 493 (9th
Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 105 S. Ct. 3085 (1985); Light v. Blue Cross and Blue
Shield, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 558 (S.D. Miss. 1985); Nolan v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 588 F.
Supp. 1375 (E.D. Mich. 1984); Drummond v. McDonald Corp., 167 Cal. App. 3d 428, 213
Cal. Rptr. 164 (1985).
114. 36 Or. App. 441, 585 P.2d 12 (1978). See supra text accompanying notes 74-78.
115. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85 (1983), discussed supra note 78 and
text accompanying notes 38-39.
116. 731 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1984).
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that ERISA preempted a state law requiring a plan to give service credit (for benefit accrual purposes) for service rendered by
post-retirement age employees. Regulations under ERISA specifically authorizing the challenged practice supported this
conclusion. 1 '
d. Debt collection- In National Bank of North America v.
Local 3, IBEW,"5s a state court upheld garnishment of pension
plan benefits. Yet at least three federal courts and one state
court have since held such garnishments preempted." 9 In addition, one federal district court has held states preempted from
collecting a pensioner's unpaid state income taxes, interest, and
penalties directly from the pension plan trustee out of the re12 0
tiree's pension benefits.
The argument for preemption in such cases goes beyond section 514, for section 206(d) of ERISA imposes special non-assignment requirements on pension plans.' 2 ' Because the conclusion in National Bank of North America that section 206(d)
prohibits only voluntary assignments is contrary to the trend of
authority, no other court has directly faced the issue of how section 514 affects garnishment of pension plans by non-family
creditors. Other courts are thus unlikely to adopt the analysis of
section 514 that was followed in National Bank of North
America, both because the issue is unlikely to arise, and because
National Bank of North America is clearly wrong. 12
117. Treas. Reg. § 1.411(b)-1(b)(3)(ii)(C) (1977). See also Waukesha Engine Div. v.
Department of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 619 F. Supp. 1310 (W.D. Wis. 1985);
Nolan v. Otis Elevator Co., No. A-51 (N.J. Feb. 26, 1986) (holding, despite Shaw, that if
a state anti-discrimination law "relates to" a plan when used to challenge disparate
treatment of employees based on age, § 514(d) nevertheless saves it).
118. 69 A.D.2d 679, 419 N.Y.S.2d 127 (1979).
119. Tenneco, Inc. v. First Va. Bank, 698 F.2d 688 (4th Cir. 1983); General Motors
Corp. v. Buha, 623 F.2d 455 (6th Cir. 1980); Commercial Mortgage Ins. v. Citizens Nat'l
Bank, 526 F. Supp. 510 (N.D. Tex. 1981); Christ Hosp. v. Greenwald, 82 Ill.
App. 3d
1024, 403 N.E.2d 700 (1980); cf. Mason v. Eastman Kodak Co. (In re Parker), 473 F.
Supp. 746 (W.D.N.Y. 1979) (stating that §§ 514(a) and 206(d) preempt any state law
that would render bankrupt's pension plan credits subject to transfer, levy, or seizure);
Trustees of the Western Conference of Teamsters Pension Trust Fund v. Kramer, No.
C81-554M (W.D. Wash. Dec. 30, 1981) (stating that ERISA preempts imposition of attorney's lien on pension plan assets).
120. Northwest Airlines v. Roemer, 603 F. Supp. 7 (D. Minn. 1984).
121. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d) (1982). The section states that, subject to various conditions
and qualifications, "[ejach pension plan shall provide that benefits provided under the
plan may not be assigned or alienated."
122. Another court of the same jurisdiction has already rejected it. Helmsley-Spear,
Inc. v. Winter, 74 A.D.2d 195, 198, 426 N.Y.S.2d 778, 780 (1980), aff'd mem., 52 N.Y.2d
984, 419 N.E.2d 1078, 438 N.Y.S.2d 79 (1981). But see Lowery v. Spector, 77 A.D.2d 813,
813, 430 N.Y.S.2d 767, 767 (1980) (stating that "[wie find nothing in the provisions of
Federal law prohibiting a levy on [per.sion] trust funds once the trust has terminated
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In Electrical Workers, Local No. 1 Credit Union v. IBEWNECA Holiday Trust Fund,2 3 a state court held that ERISA
does not preempt the garnishment of welfare benefit plan assets,
even if the plan contains a spendthrift clause. If a plan is not a
pension benefit plan, section 206(d)(1) of ERISA does not require spendthrift language. Thus, section 514(a) of ERISA
would be the sole bar to the garnishment. The Electrical Workers court declined to apply section 514(a) out of concern that an
unwarranted "regulatory vacuum" could be the result of such
preemption. 2 4
A federal district court, with the approval of the Sixth Circuit
in a post-Shaw affirmance, reached the same result in Local 212
25
IBEW Vacation Trust Fund v. Local 212 IBEW Credit Union
as did the state court in Electrical Workers. The court reasoned
that the garnishment statute did not "relate to" the plan because "[t]he only 'regulatory' effect which can be identified is
the administrative expense the fund may incur in processing the
garnishment notices. We consider this 'regulatory' effect minimal and therefore insufficient to invoke ERISA's preemption
provision.' 26 In adopting this argument the court chose to interpret the "relate to" language by reference to the definition of
"State" in the larger phrase "State laws insofar as-they . . . relate to." Section 514(c)(2) of ERISA declares that the term
"State" "includes a State . . . which purports to regulate . .
the terms and conditions of employee benefit plans . ...127
and the principal is available for distribution," and citing National Bank of North
America with apparent approval); cf. Plymouth Rock Fuel Corp. v. Bank of N.Y., 102
Misc. 2d 235, 236, 425 N.Y.S.2d 908, 908 (App. Term 1979) (per curiam) ("We are constrained to follow NationalBank of North America"). In addition, the 1984 amendment
of § 206(d) to permit involuntary assignments under qualified domestic relations orders
would seem to clarify congressional intent to prohibit all other involuntary assignments,
thus overruling National Bank of North America. See infra Part III.B.
123. 583 S.W.2d 154 (Mo. 1979).
124.
The enforcement of state court money judgments by creditors is a valid area of
state concern, and is one which is totally unregulated by ERISA with respect to
welfare plans. We decline to interpret ERISA to require preemption of Missouri
laws in this area, "in the absence of any legislative declaration that Congress
intended to create an enormous regulatory vacuum in areas that traditionally
have been matters of vital state concern."
583 S.W.2d at 159 (quoting Gast, 585 P.2d at 23).
125. 549 F. Supp. 1299 (S.D. Ohio 1982), affd per curiam, 735 F.2d 1010 (6th Cir.
1984).
126. 549 F. Supp. at 1302. In this analysis the court was following the dissent in
Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 679 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir.
1982), vacated on other grounds, 463 U.S. 1 (1983). For a discussion of Franchise Tax
Bd. see infra text accompanying notes 129-35.
127. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(2) (1982).
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Thus, goes the argument, a law cannot be preempted by section
514(a) unless it purports to regulate plan terms and
28
conditions.1
The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, held in Franchise Tax
Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust 29 that state interests must give way to ERISA when a state attempts to collect
the tax liabilities of employees directly from employee welfare
benefit plans. This case, which the Supreme Court vacated on
jurisdictional grounds, involved an attempt by California to collect delinquent personal income taxes of union members by levying against money held in their union's vacation fund (Vacation
Trust). The Vacation Trust, an employee welfare benefit plan
under ERISA, was governed by a spendthrift clause purportedly
protecting it from voluntary and involuntary assignments of all
kinds.
The district court in Franchise Tax Board allowed the state
to obtain the delinquent taxes directly from the Vacation Trust
because the statutes authorizing this procedure did "not directly
or indirectly regulate employee benefit plans and are wholly peripheral to the purposes of ERISA."'' 0 A Ninth Circuit panel
reversed the district court, over the dissent of Judge Tang. "'
The short opinion of the court was premised largely on the conclusory assertion that Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan,Inc. 3' required reversal of the district court judgment.
In dissent Judge Tang argued that section 514 only preempts
state laws having a "regulatory effect" on plans. The only "regulatory" effect at issue, he said, was "the administrative burden
associated with processing levy notices." 33 He argued, however,
that "[tihis effect is simply too minor to be considered 'regula128. Several other courts have resorted to the device of reasoning that a law which
does not regulate the terms and conditions of plans cannot, by definition, "relate to"
plans, even though in an individual case the law affects an employee benefit plan. See,
e.g., Rebaldo v. Cuomo; 749 F.2d 133, 137 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2701
(1985) (discussed supra text accompanying notes 100-04); Lane v. Goren, 743 F.2d 1337,
1339 (9th Cir. 1984) (described supra text accompanying note 96); Sasso v. Vachris, 66
N.Y.2d 28, 494 N.Y.S.2d 856, 484 N.E.2d 1359 (1985) (discussed supra footnotes 67-69
and accompanying text).
129. 679 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated on other grounds, 463 U.S. 1 (1983).
130. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, No. 80-02741-R
(C.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 1980), reprintedin Appendix C of Supreme Court Jurisdictional Statement, at 21 (emphasis added).
131. 679 F.2d 1307 (1982).
132. 451 U.S. 504 (1981). For a discussion of Alessi, see supra text accompanying
notes 42-45.
133. 679 F.2d at 1312 (Tang, J., dissenting).
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tory.' ",134 The dissent also noted that "[a] finding of federal preemption here will pose a serious obstacle to the state's exercise
of [its sovereign taxing] power, casting doubt on section 514(a)'s
constitutionality."35
The foregoing cases deal with attempts to reach plan assets to
satisfy creditors of participants. In Deiches v. Carpenters'
Health & Welfare Fund,3 6 a federal court held that a creditor
of the employer could use New Jersey's Insolvency & Reorganization "Preference" statute- 7 to reach welfare benefit plan assets. For a substantial period, the employer had been delinquent
in paying $17,212.50 to a multiemployer plan. Less than a month
after the employer satisfied the liability, one of its creditors filed
a state action for a determination of insolvency and appointment of a receiver. State law authorized the receiver to void the
employer's recent payment to the plan as a preferential transfer,
and the plan resisted the receiver's demand for refund based on,
among other things, section 514(a) of ERISA. The court held
that section 514(a) did not preempt the state preference law because it did not "in any way affect the internal workings or rules
and regulations of the ERISA plan."' 8
e. State taxes- Despite the constitutional concerns Judge
Tang raised in his Franchise Tax Board dissent, two federal district courts have held that states are without power to levy a tax
on an employee benefit plan measured in terms of the benefits
paid. In National Carriers' Conference Committee v. Heffernan,139 plaintiffs were trustees of the Railroad Employees National Dental Plan. Under Connecticut law, the plan was subject
to an annual tax of 2.75% imposed on the amounts paid as benefits to or on behalf of the residents of Connecticut by "em134. Id.
135. Id. at 1313. Judge Tang's tenth amendment constitutionality argument, weak as
it appeared from his opinion, was further damaged by the Supreme Court's subsequent
decision in EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983). There, the Court held that the federal government could apply the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L.
No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982)), to the
employment relationships between state governments and their employees. The constitutional claim under the tenth amendment failed in that case because even such federal
interference with the hiring and firing of state employees "does not 'directly impair' the
State's ability to 'structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions.' " 460 U.S. at 239. It would seem to follow a fortiori that preemption of a state tax
collection procedure affecting only a small proportion of collections-namely, collections
against employee benefit plans-similarly need not be found violative of the tenth
amendment.
136. 572 F. Supp. 766 (D.N.J. 1983).
137. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:14-14 (West 1969).
138. 572 F. Supp. at 771.
139. 454 F. Supp. 914 (D. Conn. 1978).
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ployee welfare benefit plans. 1 40 Then-district Judge Newman
gave several reasons for holding the tax law preempted.
First, ERISA contains no savings clause directed at state tax
laws.14 1 Second, ERISA's legislative history revealed that Congress had considered and rejected a savings clause for state tax
laws. 142 Finally, the court noted that if section 514(a) did not
preempt the law at issue, a state could use tax laws to regulate
benefit plans. 4
In General Motors Corp. v. CaliforniaState Board of Equalization,1" the complaining taxpayers were insurance companies
taxed by California on their "gross premiums. ' 14'5 The insurers
had sold group policies to provide employee benefits through
plans under which the plan sponsors' funds were used to pay all
benefit claims below a so-called trigger point. Under California
law "gross premiums" under these circumstances include the
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-212b (1983).
141. "In the tax area ... where Congress has not excluded even general tax statutes
from preemption, a statute specifically directed at an ERISA-covered plan must certainly come within the preemption provision." 454 F. Supp. at 916.
142.
When the conference committee was considering the House and Senate version of the bill that eventually became ERISA, it received a recommendation
from the administration regarding the scope of the preemption provision. The
Secretaries of Labor and Treasury jointly suggested a revised preemption provision which read in part:
Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, a State shall have the
authority to prescribe rules and regulations governing the tax qualification and taxation of contributions, distributions or income, of an employee pension plan (including a trust forming a part of such plan) as
defined in the Welfare and Pension Plan Disclosure Act.
Administration Recommendations to the House and Senate Conferees on H.R. 2
to Provide for Pension Reform (April, 1974) ....
Id. at 917 (citation omitted).
143.
In the present action the challenged statute imposes a 2.75% annual tax on benefits paid by employee benefit plans. This contrasts with Connecticut's tax on
the premiums received by insurance companies, which is only 2%.. . .This tax
structure may operate as an incentive to use traditional insurance, rather than
ERISA-covered plans. Although the impact of the tax discrepancy may be only
nominal at present, its economic impact is not the measure of its significance.
Rather, the discrepancy is illustrative of the potential use of taxation as a means
of regulation. Because of that potential, preempting state taxation of ERISAcovered plans is necessary to effectuate Congressional objectives.
Id. at 918 (citations omitted). In General Split Corp. v. Mitchell, 523 F. Supp. 427 (E.D.
Wis. 1981), the court addressed a "use of taxation as a means of regulation" and struck it
down. Under a state-wide health risk-sharing program there at issue, employee welfare
benefits plans "themselves [were] taxed and [were] required to contribute to the risksharing plan." Id. at 431.
144. 600 F. Supp. 76 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
145. CAL.CONST. art XIII, § 28; CAL.REv. & TAX. CODE §§ 12201, 12221 (West 1970 &
Supp. 1985).

140.
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"entire cost of [an] employee benefit plan. '14 Thus, the tax was
computed, in part, based on the benefits paid directly out of
plan sponsors' assets. The district court held this tax preempted
as an indirect tax on benefit payments "impeding the discretion
of plan sponsors to fund their plan guarantees through a combi1 47
nation of general assets and excess risk insurance.
f. Other state law issues- The Supreme Court in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts4 s recently noted that
Massachusetts's law requiring all health insurance policies on
state residents to provide minimum mental-health benefits1 '
certainly "related to" employee benefit plans, insofar as the latter purchase group health insurance policies.16 0 Two courts have
ruled that where state laws invalidate certain types of subrogation clauses, section 514(a) preempts those laws if they are invoked to prevent the application of a subrogation clause in an
employee benefit plan.15 ' The Seventh Circuit has stated in
dicta that a state statute immunizing a settling defendant from
any claim of contribution by a nonsettling defendant would be
inapplicable, due to section 514(a), to the settlement of the Labor Department's suit against the Teamster health and welfare
fund and its trustees. 52 A federal district court has held, in a
case called Armco, Inc. v. Ludwick,153 that ERISA preempts
state laws providing for administrative hearings to resolve claims
under employee benefit plans. Under the terms of ERISA, a
claim may ultimately be made in state court; but the state court
procedure at issue in Armco required a prior administrative
hearing. The district court opined that ERISA's goal of uniform146. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 32 Cal. 3d 649, 661, 186
Cal. Rptr. 578, 585, 652 P.2d 426, 433 (1982).
147. 600 F. Supp. at 80. The court also based its result partly on ERISA
§ 514(b)(5)(B)(i), which had not been enacted when National Carriers' Conference
Comm. v. Heffernan, 454 F. Supp. 914 (D. Conn. 1978) was decided. See infra Part III.A.
148. 105 S. Ct. 2380 (1985).
149. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 175, § 47B (West 1977).
150. 105 S. Ct. at 2389. The Court went on, however, to find that the state law was
saved by the insurance exception to § 514(a) contained in § 514(b)(2)(A). 105 S. Ct. at
2391-92. See also Michigan United Food and Commercial Workers Unions v. Baerwaldt,
767 F.2d 308 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 801 (1986). Cf. Hood v. Prudential
Ins. Co. of Am., 460 So. 2d 1227 (Ala, 1984) (holding that an employee's claim against
the employer's insurer for bad faith refusal to pay employee benefits was saved by
§ 514(b)(2)(A), although the same claim against the employee benefit plan under which
the insurer provided benefits to the employees was preempted by § 514(a)).
151. Davis v. Line Constr. Benefit Fund, 589 F. Supp. 146 (W.D. Mo. 1984); Hunt v.
Sherman, 345 N.W.2d 750 (Minn. 1984).
152. Donovan v. Robbins, 752 F.2d 1170, 1179-80 (7th Cir. 1984).
153. Armco, Inc. v. Ludwick, No. 82-4066 (D. Kan. April 15, 1982) (preliminarily enjoining state administrative hearing).
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ity would be frustrated if there were substantial differences in
the law and procedure applied to employee benefit claims made
in state and federal court. 15 4 A state court has held that when
disability benefits under an ERISA plan are funded through an
insurance contract sponsored and maintained by the employer,
the question whether a benefit claimant must exhaust administrative remedies under the plan is a federal one, and conflicting
principles of state insurance law are preempted. 155 On the other
hand, three courts have held that state authorities bearing on
the issue of whether pre-judgment interest is to be paid on a
judgment arising out of an ERISA claim are not preempted by
56
section 514(a).
Perhaps the most conceptually nettlesome preemption issues
are those implicating ERISA policies arising one step removed
from an actual plan. In the recent case of Scott v. Gulf Oil
Corp., 157 the Ninth Circuit took advantage of the arguable remoteness between a claim and an existing plan to partially avoid
preemption. Gulf Oil sold a refinery to Thrifty Oil Corp., and
negotiated terms of employment for refinery employees who
chose to stay with the refinery under its new ownership. After
the change, some employees sued Gulf, claiming that it had
cheated them out of severance pay and tricked them into accepting employment with Thrifty without being covered by a
severance pay plan. The employees alleged that they were entitled both to severance pay under a plan with Gulf, and to participation in a severance pay plan that Thrifty should have provided. The employees averred four state-law causes of action:
breach of employment agreement, violation of public policy,
breach of duty to act fairly and in good faith, and fraud and
breach of fiduciary duties.
The court held that the Gulf severance pay system amounted
to an ERISA plan. Because the breach of contract claim was a
claim for failure to pay benefits under that plan, it was wholly
preempted. Each of the other claims, however, rested partly on
the alleged terms of the Gulf plan, and partly on misrepresenta154. Typescript op. at 3.
155. Rhodes v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 135 Mich. App. 735, 356 N.W.2d 247 (1984); Martin v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 140 Mich. App. 441, 364 N.W.2d 348 (1985). Cf. Donovan v. Schmoutey, 592 F. Supp. 1361, 1404 (D. Nev. 1984) (noting that a state statute
setting forth procedures for enforcing rights secured by realty cannot limit the Labor
Department's enforcement authority because the statute is preempted by § 514).
156. Folz v. Marriott Corp., 594 F. Supp. 1007 (W.D. Mo. 1984); Gould, Inc. v.
PBGC, 589 F. Supp. 164 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); LLC Corp. v. PBGC, 537 F. Supp. 355 (E.D.
Mo. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 703 F.2d 301 (8th Cir. 1983).
157. 754 F.2d 1499 (9th Cir. 1985).
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tions that Thrifty would be paying severance benefits comparable to those under the Gulf plan. In fact, the complaint alleged,
Thrifty had no severance pay plan. The court chose to divide
each of these three claims in two: one for benefits under the Gulf
plan, and one for prospective benefits under the plan that they
had rightfully expected Thrifty to adopt. The first half of each
claim, the court found, "related to" a plan, but the second half
did not, because each was for benefits under a purely fictional
plan, and "[tlo preempt plaintiff's state-law claim for prospective benefits under these circumstances would leave them without an avenue of redress for the wrongs that they have alleged." 15 8 The problem with this reasoning, of course, is that it
does not apply to a hypothetical case in which Thrifty has a severance pay plan in name, but under which the complaining employees receive nothing. 15 9 Yet there seems to be little logic in
reaching different preemption results in this hypothetical case,
on the one hand, and in the actual Scott case, on the other.
Authier v. Ginsberg s" is another difficult preemption case
which would have lent itself to the sort of fine line-drawing exhibited in Scott, but in Authier the Sixth Circuit took a broader
view of section 514. A plan administrator, Mr. Authier, who was
also an employee of the plan sponsor, was fired for alerting his
co-fiduciaries and the plan participants of his concern about potential problems surrounding termination of the plan. Michigan
case law provided that an employee may not be fired in violation
of a "clearly articulated, well-accepted public policy," ' and a
jury found specifically that Authier was discharged for fulfilling
his duties under ERISA. The Sixth Circuit held that "since
ERISA created a substantive element of the Michigan action
and since the action turns upon a fiduciary's duties under
1 2
ERISA," ERISA preempted Authier's claim.
158. Id. at 1506. See also Miller v. Lay Trucking Co., 606 F. Supp. 1326 (N.D. Ind.
1985) (stating that ERISA does not preempt claim for misrepresentation leading to a
change in plans because the tort occurred when plaintiffs were not members of a plan);
Shaver v. N.C. Monroe Constr. Co., 63 N.C. App. 605, 306 S.E.2d 519 (1983) (stating that
ERISA does not preempt claim that defendants misrepresented the existence of a nonexistent plan).
159. In Phillips v. Amoco Oil Co., 614 F. Supp. 694 (N.D. Ala. 1985), a case similar to
the foregoing hypothetical, the court reached an opposite preemption result than the
court in Scott. See supra note 109.
160. 757 F.2d 796 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 208 (1985).
161. Clifford v. Cactus Drilling Corp., 419 Mich, 356, 367, 353 N.W.2d 469, 474 (1984)
(Williams, C.J., dissenting).
162. 757 F.2d at 800.
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C.

The Courts' Revolt

The foregoing web of decisions, some reconcilable and some
not, demonstrates at least two points. First, although the courts
generally agree that Congress intended ERISA to "occupy the
field" of employee benefit plan regulation, many have been unwilling to treat preemption under ERISA any differently than
they would under a federal statute that "occupies the field"
without containing a specific preemption provision. Thus, despite the facial clarity of section 514, conflicting judicial decisions abound. The basic judge-made preemption doctrine requires balancing, and judges necessarily differ in their views of
how to weigh competing state and federal interests. Were the
courts to follow the precise language of section 514(a), diverI
gences of result would occur less frequently.
Even more perplexing, series of decisions by a single court or a
single judge sometimes show a disturbing tendency to swing between radically opposed approaches to the preemption issue, as
evidenced by Judge Renfrew's shift between Agsalud and Hewlett-Packard, on the one hand, and Stone on the other; 6 3 by
Judge Kearse's shift between her pre- and post-Alessi decisions
in Kramarsky, followed by another marked shift by a different
4
Second Circuit panel in its post-Shaw decision in Rebaldo;'
and by the Sixth Circuit's shift from a restricted view of preemption in the Local 212 IBEW Vacation Trust Fund garnishment case and a broad view in Authier.16 1 These inconsistencies
163. See Hutchinson & Ifshin, supra note 3, at 59-60. See discussions of Agsalud at
supra text accompanying notes 59-61; of Hewlett-Packard at supra text accompanying
notes 46-48; and of Stone at supra notes 84-85. Certainly, the judicial position in such
cases as Stone, where state laws are held to "affect" employee plans but not to "relate
to" them, can be viewed as the mere manipulation of concepts to permit analysis
equivalent to that explicitly required in the balancing of state and federal interests
under the judicial doctrines of preemption.
164. Compare Delta Air Lines v. Kramarsky, 650 F.2d 1287 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding
that summary U.S. Supreme Court dismissals of appeals in pregnancy benefits preemption cases mandated finding that state pregnancy benefits laws were not preempted by
ERISA), with Delta Air Lines v. Kramarsky, 666 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1981) (on rehearing)
(holding that Alessi vitiated the authority of summary dismissals in pregnancy benefits
cases, and mandated finding that state pregnancy benefits laws are preempted by
ERISA), and Rebaldo v. Cuomo, 749 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that a law setting
the minimum charges an employee benefit plan can pay a hospital for services does not
"relate to" such plans), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2702 (1985). For a discussion of the
Kramarsky issues see supra notes 64, 78 and accompanying text, and of Rebaldo see
supra text accompanying notes 100-04.
165. Compare Local 212 IBEW Vacation Trust Fund v. Local 212 IBEW Credit
Union, 735 F.2d 1010 (6th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (holding that state garnishment proceedings against employee welfare benefits plans are not preempted by ERISA), with
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seem attributable to judicial uncertainty as to whether ERISA
preemption should be addressed according to the straightforward strictures of the statute, or under the more searching but
less definite standards of the judicial doctrines of preemption.
The debt collection cases, taken as a group, are also a good
example of radical, inconsistent shifts in approach. Where courts
have displayed faithful adherence to the literal language and
legislative history of section 514(a), ignoring the contention that
the breadth of section 514(a)'s sweep may have been "inadvertent," ' there has been little discussion. The relation between
state law and the benefit plan having been established on the
facts, the inquiry is soon at an end, as it was in Franchise Tax
Board. Without doubt, the state collection statutes at issue
there, as applied to employee benefit plan funds, "relate to"
those plans in the ordinary sense Senators Williams and Javits
and Representative Dent contemplated.1 7 But in this sense, so
do the general laws of garnishment and attachment held not to
"relate to" benefit plans in Stone and other cases involving marital obligations.
Had the Supreme Court affirmed Franchise Tax Board on its
merits, it would have stripped Stone and other marital obligation cases of the pretense that attachment statutes can "affect"
plans yet not "relate to" them within the meaning of section 514
of ERISA. If the concept of "relate to" carries the ordinary
meaning ascribed to it in ERISA's legislative history and in
Shaw, that meaning could not be preserved unless the result in
Franchise Tax Board mirrored the result in Stone. The difference in result between these two cases (as well as the continuing
subplot of dispute over the proper result in non-marital debt
collection cases) is convincing evidence that lower courts have
sometimes disregarded the rigid language of section 514(a) when
necessary to reach an acceptable accommodation of important,
competing state and federal interests.1 68
In the one area in which ERISA has arguably not preempted
Authier v. Ginsberg, 757 F.2d 796 (6th Cir.) (holding that state law prohibiting employee
discharge in violation of public policy is preempted by ERISA if ERISA policies are the
ones alleged to be violated), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 208 (1985). For discussions of Local
212 IBEW Vacation Trust Fund see supra text accompanying notes 125-27, and of
Authier see supra text accompanying notes 160-62.

166. See S. REP. No. 646, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1982), discussed infra text accompanying note 197.
167.

See discussion supra text accompanying notes 9-11.

168. The Third Circuit in Danziger (see supra note 49 and accompanying text), on
the other hand, displayed a disturbing unwillingness to search for such an
accommodation.
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the field by implication-namely, regulation of the contents of
welfare benefit plans-preemption of state laws via section 514
has only marginally served the purposes that Congress set out to
achieve in enacting ERISA. Such preemption precludes many
interstate differences among state laws, but not all.169 The premise of ERISA preemption in the pension area was that conflicts
and inconsistencies between comprehensive federal regulation,
on the one hand, and state and local regulation, on the other,
would be avoided altogether. 170 Without federal regulation of the
substantive content of welfare plans, preemption by ERISA in
the welfare area offers only the benefit of scant but uniform nationwide welfare plan administration (and then only if all plans
are self-insured), countered by the substantial burden of a regulatory vacuum that is filled, if at all, by ad hoc judicial creation
of substantive rules. This is far different than the policy balance
Congress struck in preempting state pension plan regulation.
Given the paucity of federal regulation of welfare benefit
plans, and the occasional gaps in federal pension regulation,
there is certainly room for argument in favor of a different legislative approach to preemption, especially where welfare benefit
plans are concerned. Senator Javits expressed fear of "hastily
contrived" state laws "not clearly connected to the Federal regulatory scheme. 1 71 But the cases demonstrate that ERISA itself
often represents the "hasty contrivance," and that its rough
169. In repeated congressional testimony since 1974, the ERISA Industry Committee
(ERIC) and others have warned against the social costs of requiring one multistate employer to comply with different benefit laws in different states. See, e.g., 1978 Oversight
Hearings,supra note 15, at 522. Others have, of course, disputed the seriousness of these
costs. See, e.g., ERISA: Exemption from Preemption for Hawaii PrepaidHealth Care
Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relations of the House
Comm. on Education & Labor, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 90, 94 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
1982 Hawaii Hearings]. However, it is clear that the ERIC position is shared by many
and forms a prime motivation for the breadth of § 514(a). Despite this, the exemption of
state insurance laws in ERISA § 514(b), as interpreted in cases such as Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 105 S. Ct. 2380 (1985), and Wadsworth v. Whaland, 562 F.2d
70 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 980 (1978), a much earlier decision of the First
Circuit reaching the same conclusion as Metropolitan Life, has had the same effect as
direct state requirements on benefit plans would have had, insofar as plans are funded
by insurance. See also Insurance Comm'r of Md. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 296 Md.
334, 463 A.2d 793 (1983) (holding that § 514(b) allows states to direct insured plans to
make payments to particular types of providers). To the extent plan sponsors wish to
avoid the expense of purchasing policies with different state-mandated benefits, the difference between § 514's impact on self-insured plans and its impact on third-party insured plans creates an unintended incentive for sponsors to shift away from third-party
insurance and toward self-insurance.
170. 120 CONG. REc. 29,942 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Javits); 1978 Oversight Hearings,
supra note 15, at 531 (remarks of Rep. Erlenborn).
171. 120 CONG. REc. 29,942 (1974).
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edges might best be smoothed by sound judicial application of
state laws.
III.

LEGISLATIVE CONCESSIONS TO FLEXIBILITY IN

ERISA

PREEMPTION

As early as 1974 ERISA's drafters knew that they might have
to reshape section 514 if experience under the enacted provision
proved too difficult. As we have seen, courts have experienced
difficulties from the beginning. Only in 1983 and 1984, however,
did Congress finally alter the scope of section 514(a): first to permit partial enforcement of the Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act
struck down in Standard Oil Co. v. Agsalud,17 2 and second to
partially legitimize the judicial behavior displayed in Stone v.
Stone17 3 and the other family property cases. The following section briefly discusses these two revisions, both to clarify where
section 514(a) stands today and to demonstrate the extreme difficulty of using legislation to overcome the overinclusiveness of
section 514 as enacted.
A.

The Hawaii PrepaidHealth Care Act and Section 301 of
Public Law 97-473

The tension created by section 514's injection into the welfare
benefit plan area produced Standard Oil Co. v. Agsalud,17 4 and
in turn elicited some of the original proposals to restrict section
514's broad sweep legislatively. These proposals resulted in a
1983 amendment to ERISA, but the change was limited so as (a)
to cover only one state, Hawaii, and (b) to maintain preemption
of the specific state law provision that generated the dispute in
Agsalud. The amendment to ERISA saves from section 514(a)
preemption the substantive provisions of the Hawaii Prepaid
Health Care Act 17 5 that were in effect September 2, 1974, except
insofar as they govern reporting, disclosure, and fiduciary re172. 442 F. Supp. 695 (N.D. Cal. 1977), afl'd, 633 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1980), aff'd
mem., 454 U.S. 801 (1981). See supra text accompanying notes 59-61.
173. 450 F. Supp. 919 (N.D. Cal. 1978), a/I'd, 632 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 922 (1981). See supra text accompanying notes 85-86.
174. 442 F. Supp. 695 (N.D. Cal. 1977), a/I'd, 633 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1980), aff'd
mem., 454 U.S. 801 (1981).
175. HAWAII REV. STAT. ch. 393 (1982).
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sponsibility matters which are governed by ERISA. 7 s In language not made a part of ERISA, the amending act declared
that "[tihe amendment made by this section shall not be considered a precedent with respect to extending such amendment to
177
any other State law."
Hawaii's Prepaid Health Care Act, enacted in June 1974, less
than three months prior to the enactment of ERISA, requires
employers in Hawaii to provide employees with prepaid health
insurance.1 7 Where applicable, employers must generally pay at
least half of the premiums, and all premiums in excess of 1.5%
of wages.17 The Act mandates minimum required types of coverage: 120 days of inpatient hospital care; outpatient care; surgery; home, office, and hospital visits by physicians; laboratory
services; and maternity care. 8 0 To preclude any conflict, the Act
also "self-destructs" upon the effective date of any federal law
"that provides for voluntary prepaid health care for the people
of Hawaii in a manner at least as favorable as the health care
provided by this chapter, or upon the effective date of federal
legislation that provides for mandatory health care for the people of Hawaii."''
176. The language inserted by the amendment reads as follows:
(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), subsection [514](a) shall not apply to the Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act (Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 393-1
through 393-51).
(B) Nothing in subparagraph (A) shall be construed to exempt from subsection (a)(i) any State tax law relating to employee benefit plans, or
(ii) any amendment of the Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act enacted after September 2, 1974, to the extent it provides for more than the
effective administration of such Act as in effect on such date.
(C) Notwithstanding subparagraph (A), parts 1 and 4 of this subtitle, and the
preceding sections of this part to the extent they govern matters which
are governed by the provisions of such parts 1 and 4, shall supersede the
Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act (as in effect on or after the date of the
enactment of this paragraph), but the Secretary may enter into cooperative arrangements under this paragraph and section 506 with officials of
the State of Hawaii to assist them in effectuating the policies of provisions of such Act which are superseded by such parts.
ERISA § 514(b)(5), as added by Pub. L. No. 97-473, § 301(a), 96 Stat. 2605, 2611-12
(1983).
177. Pub. L. No. 97-473, § 301(b), 96 Stat. 2605, 2612 (1983).
178. HAWAII REV. STAT. ch. 393 (1982).
179. Id. § 393-13.
180. Id. § 393-7(c).
181. Id. § 393-51. Comparison of pre- and post-Act data indicates that the health
insured portion of Hawaii's workforce rose by 46,000 persons, or from less than 90% to
98%, as a result of the Act's passage. 1982 Hawaii Hearings, supra note 169, at 12-13,
25, 102, 116-17 (1982) (statements of Joshua Agsalud, Director, Hawaii Dep't of Labor;
Albert H. Yuen, President, Hawaii Medical Servs. Assoc.; Spark M. Matsunaga, U.S.
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At the outset of 1976, Standard Oil of California was apparently in compliance with the Act.18 2 In that year, however, Hawaii amended the Act to require, for the first time, coverage of
drug and alcohol treatment.18 3 Standard, which did not bring itself into compliance with the 1976 amendment, sued to prevent
enforcement action by Hawaii, and prevailed on the ground that
84
the Hawaii law was preempted.
In 1977, soon after the litigation began, Senators Inouye and
Matsunaga introduced a bill that would have made ERISA inapplicable to employee benefit plans maintained solely for the purpose of complying with "health insurance laws."18 5 The bill was
unsuccessful. A bill the same Senators introduced in 1979 would
have retained ERISA coverage of "health insurance laws," but
would have exempted from section 514(a) Hawaii's law, as in effect on January 1, 1979, and any other state law found to be
substantially identical to Hawaii's.' 8 This bill was likewise
unsuccessful.
In 1980 a Hawaii exemption became part of the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 (MPPAA), s7 as
passed by the Senate on two separate occasions. 88 The 1980 version preserved the Hawaii Act in effect January 1, 1979,189 but
Senator (Hawaii)).
182. 1982 Hawaii Hearings, supra note 169, at 104 (statement of Sen. Matsunaga).
183. 1976 Hawaii Sess. Laws ch. 25 (amending HAWAn REv. STAT. § 393-7(c)).

184. See supra text accompanying notes 59-61.
185. S. 1383, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), reprinted in ERISA Improvements Act of
1978: Joint Hearingson S. 3017 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on
Human Resources and the Subcomm. on Private Pension Plans and Employee Fringe
Benefits of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 94 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as 1978 ERISA Improvements Hearings].
186. The exemption would not, however, have covered "any provision of a State law
which the Secretary determines to be similar to any provision of parts 1 [Reporting and
disclosure], 4 [Fiduciary Responsibility] and 5 [Administration and Enforcement] of...
subtitle" B of title I of ERISA. S. 209, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 155(2) (1979), reprinted in
1979 ERISA Improvements Hearings,supra note 16, at 9, 43. The Senate Committee on
Labor and Human Resources ultimately approved this bill, but the Committee deleted
any reference to Hawaii and instead exempted any state law insofar as it required or
regulated arrangements under which employers would provide health care benefits or
services. The Committee also added a provision allowing the Secretary of Labor to enter
into cooperative arrangements with states having such laws "to assist such States in effectuating the policies of provisions of such laws which are superseded by" parts 1, 4,
and 5 of subtitle B, title I of ERISA. S. 209, as amended and approved by the Committee
on Labor and Human Resources, § 155(2), reprinted in S. 209 SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS,
supra note 21, at 90, 130-31.
187.
188.

Pub. L. No. 96-364, 94 Stat. 1208.
H.R. 3904, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 409, 126 CoNG. Rac. 20,247 (1980); 126 CONG.

Rac. 23,291 (1980); S. 3151, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. Rac. 27,069 (1980) (remarks
of Sen. Matsunaga).
189.

The 1980 version also exempted the Hawaii Act only to the extent its provisions
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added the proviso that it not be construed to exempt from section 514(a) "any State tax law relating to employee benefit
plans."19 0 The House unequivocally rejected inclusion of the Hawaii preemption language in MPPAA, however, in order to "preserve the coalition of business support for [MPPAA] that enabled us to save the legislation from the antilabor amendments
that threatened to kill it."'1 91
The language upon which the Senate had acted favorably in
1980 was reintroduced in the Senate in 1981.192 Under this language, the Hawaii Act remained frozen as of January 1, 1979. A
House bill, however, deleted this limitation entirely. 9 3
In 1982 the Senate passed a bill embodying the same general
language, but with one important difference-it only saved the
were not described in parts 1, 4, and 5 of subtitle B, title I of ERISA. In addition, the
1980 version added the requirement that the Secretary of Labor "conduct a study on the
feasibility of extending the exemption from section 514(a)" to similar laws of other
states, and prescribed a report to Congress within two years.
In a summary of the provision reported jointly to the Senate, the Labor and Finance
Committees noted that "this provision should not be interpreted as a precedent for subsequent exceptions for individual States. While subsequent exceptions may result from a
study of the Hawaii plan, the result may also be a repeal of the exception and a return to
total preemption." 126 CONG. REc. 19,598-600, 20,242-47 (1980).
190. ERISA § 514(b)(5)(B)(i), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(5)(B)(i) (1982).
In the previous session of Congress the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources had expressed the view that National Carriers' Conference Comm. v. Heffernan,
454 F. Supp. 914 (D. Conn. 1978), was correct in holding that ERISA preempted a state
statute imposing a tax on benefits paid to state residents under an ERISA-covered dental plan. S. 209 SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS, supra note 21, at 47 & n.21. The legislative
history of Public Law 97-473 twice explained the "state tax law" exception. First, the
Senate Finance Committee report on the bill stated that "the provision does not affect
the status, under the preemption provisions of ERISA, of any State tax law relating to
employee benefit plans." S. REP. No. 646, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1982) (emphasis
added). This language suggests a "hands off" approach to the question of whether or not
ERISA preempts any state tax law, including Hawaii's. Yet it does raise the question of
why state tax laws were singled out. Although the Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act provides for subsidies to employers in certain cases to help them meet their obligations
under the Act, there seems to be no "tax" on employers associated with these subsidies.
See HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 393-41 to -47 (1976). Penalties and recoveries, however, are
available against noncomplying employers. Id. §§ 393-33, -48 (1976 & Supp. 1982).
When Senator Dole introduced the Senate report on Public Law 97-473 on the Senate
floor, he gave a slightly different, but consistent, explanation of the "state tax law"
clause: "The bill amends ERISA to provide that Hawaii law relating to employer maintained health insurance plans would not be preempted by ERISA to the extent that the
Hawaiian law does not relate to matters thoroughly regulated under ERISA or impose
tax liability on insurancepremiums or benefits." 128 CONG. REc. S13,151 (daily ed. Oct.
1, 1982) (emphasis added).
191. 126 CONG. REc. 23,645 (1980) (remarks of Rep. Thompson).
192. S. 1232, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), reprinted in 1982 Hawaii Hearings,supra
note 169, at 8.
193. H.R. 4046, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), reprinted in 1982 Hawaii Hearings,
supra note 169, at 6.

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 19:1

Hawaii Act as in effect on January 1, 1976.194 As a result, Congress did not save from preemption the very provision that had
sparked the Standard Oil v. Agsalud 19 5 decision. Senator Matsunaga "reluctantly" agreed to this "only to facilitate House approval of the amendment."1 9 6 Yet the Senate Finance Committee maintained, in its report, that it believed "that the
preemption [in 1974] of the Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act by
ERISA was inadvertent.'1 9 7 The House, now disposed to work
with, rather than wholly reject, the Hawaii exemption proposal,
amended the Senate language to preempt all post-ERISA provisions of the Hawaii law and to bring it to the form finally enacted as section 301 of Public Law 97-473.198
194. H.R. 5470, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 301(a), 128 CONG. REc. S13,147, S13,149 (daily
ed. Oct. 1, 1982). Cf. Council of Hawaii Hotels v. Agsalud, 594 F. Supp. 449, 455 n.8 (D.
Haw. 1984) (stating that the Senate originally chose a 1977 date under the mistaken
assumption that it would not change the result in Standard Oil Co. v. Agsalud, 442 F.
Supp. 695 (N.D. Cal. 1977), aff'd, 633 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1980), aff'd mem., 454 U.S. 801
(1981)).
195. 442 F. Supp. 695 (N.D. Cal. 1977), aff'd, 633 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1980), aff'd
mem., 454 U.S. 801 (1981).
196. 128 CONG. REc. S13,154 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1982).
197. S.REP. No. 646, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1982) (emphasis added).
198. All amendments to the Hawaii Act after the date of ERISA's enactment were
excluded from exemption under the House version, except those providing for the Hawaii Act's "effective administration." Compare ERISA § 514(b)(5)(B)(ii) as enacted (excluding from exemption any post-Sept. 2, 1974, amendment of the Hawaii Act "to the
extent it provides for more than the effective administration of such Act as in effect on
such date"), with § 514(b)(5)(A), as proposed in H.R. 5470 (Senate version), 128 CONG.
REC. S13,149 (exempting from 514(a) the Hawaii Act "as in effect on January 1, 1976").
Also, the savings clause for part 5 (Administration and Enforcement) of subtitle B of
title I of ERISA was restricted. Compare ERISA § 514(b)(5)(C) as enacted (saving only
so much of part 5 as governs matters governed by parts 1 and 4) with § 514(b)(5)(C) as
proposed in H.R. 5470 (Senate version), 128 CONG. REc. S13,149 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1982)
(saving part 5 in full). Lastly, the House deleted the requirement that the Labor Department study the feasibility of extending the exemption beyond Hawaii. See H.R. 5470
(Senate version) § 301(b), 128 CONG. REc. S13,149 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1982). In its place the
House adopted the language of the 1980 Senate report on the Senate's own language:
"The amendment made by this section shall not be considered a precedent with respect
to extending such amendment to any other State law." Pub. L. No. 97-473, § 301(b), 96
Stat. 2605, 2612 (1983). Cf. 126 CONG. REc. 19,598-600, 20,242-47 (1980), quoted at supra
note 189.
Rep. Erlenborn, ranking minority member of the Education and Labor Committee,
characterized § 301(b) of Public Law 97-473 as intended "[t]o help allay the fears of
those who might otherwise view this action as the beginning of a weakening of Federal
preemption under ERISA." 128 CONG. REc. H9610 (daily ed. Dec. 13, 1982). It is not
stated whether § 301(b) is meant to forestall the use of § 301(a) as a precedent for future
legislation, a precedent for future judicial interpretation, or both. Of course, no statute
can actually forestall future legislation-on this ground, one might assume that § 301(b)
was a message to the courts, and not future Congresses. On the other hand, a court
plainly cannot use an "amendment" as "a precedent" for "extending such amendment."
Thus, one must surmise that Congress intended § 301(b) not as a command to the
courts, but rather a piece of advice to future Congresses.
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The need for, and the history of, the Hawaii amendment
sharply underscore the problems with section 514. On the one
hand, a Senate Committee claimed that the original preemption
of the Hawaii Act had been "inadvertent." And section 514(b)
makes it clear that Congress had not meant to "occupy the entire field" of mandatory health insurance. Indeed, National
Health Insurance was a lively and controversial topic during the
period when ERISA was put in place, yet Congress refrained
from going forward with it. 99 Mandatory health insurance is
sufficiently complex and difficult to implement that, should Congress decide to occupy the field, prior experimental efforts of the
states would be an important source of legislative wisdom.2 00 Accordingly, even from a perspective that is neutral with respect to
the position of Standard Oil of California and other groups that
fought to prevent the enactment of section 514(b)(5), it is likely
that the preemptive effect of section 514(a) on prepaid health
care laws was indeed unintended.
Given these unintended effects of section 514 as originally enacted, the subsequent insistence by preemption absolutists that
all laws in any way related to employee benefits be preempted
has probably deterred Congress from examining more carefully
the areas in which it actually meant, in 1974, to override state
laws and those in which it did not. There are many such laws,
and Congress has yet to address them. But, as evidenced by the
lengthy legislative history of the Hawaii exemption from preemption, use of statutory amendments to correct these inadvertances requires an enormous expenditure of time and effort-one that could have been avoided had the courts been left
to balance competing state and federal interests through a flexible and adaptive judicial doctrine of preemption.
199. Over the last twenty years, legislative proposals for federalizing the provision or
financing of health care in America, sometimes called National Health Insurance, have
been numerous and controversial. They have yet to be enacted. See, e.g., National
Health Insurance: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health of the House Comm. on
Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND
MEANS, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., SUMMARIES OF SELECTED HEALTH INSURANCE PROPOSALS AND
PROPOSALS TO RESTRUCTURE

THE FINANCING

OF PRIVATE

HEALTH INSURANCE

(Comm.

Print. 1980).
200. Cf. New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting):
To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences
to the nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.
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Qualified Domestic Relations Orders Under the
Retirement Equity Act of 1984

With Stone v. Stone 0 1 and the rest of the marital preemption
cases,20 2 Congress faced a different problem than with Standard
Oil Co. v. Agsalud2 0 In marital preemption cases, federal courts
were adopting a position diametrically opposed to the language
of the statute, as was clear from the opposite results reached in
(a) debt collection cases involving ex-spouses, and (b) debt collection cases involving unrelated creditors.20
In the hope of overcoming this problem, Congress inserted
new language in ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code to permit the application of state law in some family property cases, to
prohibit it expressly in others, and, by clear inference in the legislative history, to prohibit application of state law in all other
debt collection uses.2 0 5 The key to escaping preemption under

the new law is the "qualified domestic relations order" (QDRO),
defined in section 206(d)(3) of ERISA20 6 and section 414(p) of
the Internal Revenue Code.20
A QDRO is defined as a domestic relations order, that is, an
order pursuant to state domestic relations law relating to child
support, alimony, or family property rights of spouses, exspouses, and children, 08 that creates an alternate payee's right
to benefits under a plan, 209 and that meets several requirements

as to specificity 210 and non-interference with existing plan provisions and existing QDROs as to type, form, and amount of benefits paid.21 1 The alternate payee must be a spouse, former
21 2
spouse, child, or other dependent.
The nonassignment clauses ERISA and the Code require for

201. 450 F. Supp. 919 (1978).
202. See supra notes 82-95 and accompanying text.
203. 442 F. Supp. 695 (N.D. Cal. 1977), afl'd, 663 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1980), aff'd
mem., 454 U.S. 801 (1981).
204. See supra notes 118-38 and accompanying text.
205. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 575, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1984) (stating that the amendments "are necessary to ensure that only those orders that are excepted from the spendthrift provisions are not preempted by ERISA").
206. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1056(d)(3) (West 1985).
207. I.R.C. § 414(p) (West Supp. 1985).
208. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(B)(ii), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(ii); I.R.C. § 414(p)(1)(B).
209. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(B)(i)(I), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(i)(I); I.R.C. § 414
(p)(1)(A)(i).
210. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(C), 29 U.S.C.A. § 056(d)(3)(C); I.R.C. § 414(p)(2).
211. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(D), (E), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1056(d)(3)(D), (E); I.R.C. § 414(p)(3),
(4).
212.

ERISA § 206(d)(3)(K), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1056(d)(3)(K); I.R.C. § 414(p)(8).
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pension plans must now state that they are inapplicable to
QDROs. Instead, plans must provide for compliance with
QDROs, but not nonqualified domestic relations orders.2 3 Plans
and plan administrators are required to adopt procedures for
handling QDROs and determining whether orders are indeed
QDROs. 2 ' " The amended language makes numerous provisions
to integrate the consequences of complying with QDROs into
the existing ERISA and Code provisions governing plans in general. ' 5 Finally, new section 514(b)(7) of ERISA provides that
section 514(a) shall not apply to QDROs." '
These provisions, enacted in August 1984 as section 104 of the
Retirement Equity Act of 1984 (REA), 1 7 represent the culmination of at least six years of legislative effort. In 1978 Representative Seiberling introduced a bill that would have simply modified the anti-assignment provisions of section 206(d) of ERISA
and section 401(a)(13) of the Code by making them inapplicable
to any assignment or alienation pursuant to a decree of divorce
or separate maintenance, or an order of child support, so long as
the order did not affect the time benefits were payable, and copies of the decree or order were submitted to the Secretaries of
Labor and Treasury.21 8
In 1979 bills in both the Senate and House included similar
provisons,. this time specifying that an order would be exempt
only if it did not alter the date, timing, form, duration, or
amount of benefit payments.21 9 In 1981 Congress reconsidered
the 1979 House bill.2 20 Until this point, these bills had generated
little real activity in Congress. From 1981 on, however, comprehensive legislative proposals addressing women's pension rights
included similar provisions.2 21 These bills gradually added the
213. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(A), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1056(d)(3)(A); I.R.C. § 401(a)(13)(B).
214. ERISA §§ 206(d)(3)(G), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1056(d)(3)(G), (H); I.R.C. § 414(p)(6), (7).
215. ERISA § 206(d)(3)(F), (I), (J), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1056 (d)(3)(F), (I), (J); I.R.C. §§ 72
(m)(10), 402(a)(6) & (9), 402(e)(4), & 4 14 (p)(5).
216. ERISA § 514(b)(7), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1144(b)(7).
217. Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426 (1984).
218. H.R. 13446, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) (introduced on July 12, 1978).
219. H.R. 1884, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (introduced on Feb. 5, 1979); S. 209, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 128 (1979), reprinted in 1979 ERISA Improvements Hearings, supra
note 21, at 9, 31-32. The Senate version would also have prevented plans from honoring
any payment election not made by a participant or beneficiary. The House version would
have added a paragraph to ERISA § 206(d)(3), stating that it was not intended to invalidate, impair, or supersede any state laws governing the acquisition, division, or distribution of community or marital property.
220. H.R. 1928, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (introduced on Feb. 18, 1981).
221. See, e.g., H.R. 1641, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1981) (introduced on Feb. 4,
1981); S. 1978, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 104 (1983) (introduced on Oct. 19, 1983); S. 918,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. §§,3 & 4 (1983) (introduced on Mar. 24, 1983). See also H.R. 1488,

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 19:1

detail, including the express amendment of section 514,222 that
now appears with full force in the enacted REA provisions.
In House and Senate reports on REA, legislators described the
changes regarding marital property as a clarification necessitated by a "divergence of opinion among the courts."2'23 The
drafters also emphasized that the exception was limited to a
subset of all domestic relations orders, a limit not previously
outlined in the decisions of the courts.
Here again, as in the case of the 1983 Hawaii amendment to
section 514, Congress demonstrated the inordinate amount of
time and effort required to accomplish legislatively what might
properly have been left to the courts. Moreover, in light of the
wholesale disregard of the literal meaning of section 514(a) by
the courts in family property cases, the slowness of Congress to
amend ERISA to recognize that most state family property decrees are not preempted fostered the notion that, in all contexts,
section 514(a) did not mean what it literally says. It remains to
implied
be seen whether the courts will respect the express and
2
non-QDROs.
on
amendments
1984
the
of
limitations

IV.

FEDERAL PREEMPTION AND FEDERAL COMMON LAW

With the enactment of the two foregoing exceptions to section
514(a), Congress demonstrated the inability of the legislative
process to perform the peculiarly judicial function of delineating
the boundaries of state and federal law as they "relate to" employee benefit plans in a timely and sensitive fashion. The language of section 514(a) provides no basis on which to distinguish
a case like Stone v. Stone225 from one like Franchise Tax
Board.226 Yet correct public policy seems to demand that such a
distinction be made. The purposes and policies that led Con98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (bill identical to 1979 and 1981 House bills on marital property) (introduced on Feb. 15, 1983).
222. See S. 918, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1983).
223. H. REP. No. 655 Part 2, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1984); S. REP. No. 575, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1984). The only pro-preemption case cited for this divergence, however, was Francis v. United Technologies Corp., 458 F. Supp. 84 (N.D. Cal. 1978), which
had been overruled by the 1980 Ninth Circuit Stone decision, also cited in the reports.
224. Cf. In re Marriage of Williams, 163 Cal. App. 3d 753, 766, 209 Cal. Rptr. 827,
835 (1985) ("The legislative history of [REA] does not condemn former case law permitting distribution of pension benefits to former spouses to satisfy spousal support obligations; rather, it merely recognizes the need for uniform standards.").
225. 450 F. Supp. 919 (1978); see supra text accompanying notes 84-85.
226. 679 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated on other grounds, 463 U.S. 1 (1983); see
supra text accompanying notes 129-35.
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gress to enact ERISA provided no basis for calling a halt to state
experiments in comprehensive health care legislation, yet an
amendment was required to permit even one such experiment
that did not focus solely on insurance companies.22 7 Indeed, the
experiment under review in Rebaldo 2 8 probably did "relate to"
benefit plans, and the Second Circuit's decision to avoid preemption, although no doubt wise as a matter of policy, is rather
weak as a matter of statutory interpretation.
The problem is not merely theoretical. For courts to determine not only that state laws have been preempted but also how
and whether to fill in gaps created by preemption, they must
develop a common, coherent understanding of why state laws
have been preempted. Were the basis for ERISA preemption
similar to the broad principles of federalism set out by Justice
Frankfurter in the Garmon case, 2 9 then it would be clear that
state laws, even if preempted, remain an important source of
policy in crafting federal common law to fill the void. If preemption were limited to the subject matters ERISA covers, then it
would be reasonable to infer that state laws should be respected
only where Congress remained silent in ERISA. When all state
laws that have any relation to employee benefit plans are preempted willy nilly, however, regardless of whether their purpose
and subject matter are complementary to ERISA, it is hard for
courts to craft a reasoned basis upon which to revivify appropriate and compatible state policies through creation of a federal
common law of benefit plans. The problem with section 514(a),
succinctly stated, is that it drains the preemption doctrine of
both rationale and flexibility, implying that any law from a nonfederal source is simply not relevant to benefit plans.
The remainder of this Article discusses some federal common
law issues. This discussion is not exhaustive, but rounds out the
analysis of the serious problems attending the enactment and
interpretation of section 514(a) by focusing on the wide divergences of view the courts have shown as to the proper sources
for and scope of a federal common law for benefit plans.
An extreme example of the difficulty caused by the inflexible
preemption position reflected in the language of section 514(a) is
227. Compare Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 105 S. Ct. 2380 (1985)
(discussed supra text accompanying notes 148-50), with Standard Oil Co. v. Agsalud, 442
F. Supp. 695 (N.D. Cal. 1977), afl'd, 633 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1980), affd mem., 454 U.S.
801 (1981) (discussed supra text accompanying notes 59-61).
228. 749 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2702 (1985); see supra text
accompanying notes 100-04.
229. 359 U.S. 236 (1959); see supra text accompanying note 30.
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the district court decision in Amato v. Western Union International.230 Xerox sold Western Union International to a subsidiary of MCI Communications Corp., and by an amendment to the
Western Union pension plan, MCI caused certain Western
Union employees to be shifted from that plan to MCI's plan.
Under their old plan some employees could retire prior to age
sixty-five without any reduction in their pension. Under MCI's
plan, however, any early retirement would result in a pension
actuarially reduced from the full pension available at age sixtyfive. The employees sued Western Union, MCI, and its subsidiary on several grounds. Under ERISA, they alleged that the
amendment unlawfully reduced their "accrued benefits"; that
Western Union breached its fiduciary duties and engaged in a
prohibited transaction; that defendants caused plan assets to inure to the benefit of Western Union; that the amendment was a
partial plan termination calling for immediate vesting of prior
benefits; and that the amendment triggered notification and reporting duties that had gone unmet. Under the "common law"
plaintiffs alleged breach of contract provisions in the purchase
agreement, plan, summary plan description, and trust agreement; tortious interference with contract relations between
Western Union and plaintiffs; and unjust enrichment occasioned
by the amendment's creation of a plan surplus.
The district court dismissed all but one of the claims. It first
reasoned that ERISA defined the term "accrued benefit" as the
annual benefit commencing at normal retirement age, or the actuarial equivalent of such benefit. An annual benefit commencing prior to normal retirement age, in this case sixty-five, necessarily exceeds the actuarial equivalent of the same annual
benefit commencing at age sixty-five. The court concluded that
the benefits of which plaintiffs were deprived were not "accrued
benefits, 21 and ERISA afforded no protection regarding those
benefits. Largely on this basis, the court dismissed all of the
ERISA claims except the claim that Western Union violated section 4043 of ERISA by failing to report to the Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) that the plan had been amended
in such a way that benefits payable with respect to some participants "may be decreased." It was clear that section 514 pre230. 596 F. Supp. 963 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, and remanded,
773 F.2d 1402 (2d Cir. 1985).
231. The Second Circuit reversed this portion of the district court decision. See 773
F.2d at 1414. To the extent that the Second Circuit reversed or remanded other portions
of the decision, it did so largely to allow the district court to rethink its position in light
of the reversal on the statutory "accrued benefits" issue. See id. at 1414, 1417-19.
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vented plaintiffs from prevailing under state common law theories. The only possible remedy, then, was one under federal
common law.
On its face much of this case seemed appropriate for application of federal common law. Plaintiffs had alleged the existence
of an agreement, and a material breach of the agreement measurable in dollars. One would expect that, if true, these facts
would give rise to a right of recovery. The court, however, held
that no claim lay under federal common law. Its only explanation was a reference to a Third Circuit case, Van Orman v.
American Insurance Co., 232 in which the panel had noted, uncontroversially, that "'[w]here Congress has established an extensive regulatory network and has expressly announced its intention to occupy the field, federal courts will not lightly create
additional rights under the rubric of federal common law.' ",233
Unlike Amato, however, Van Orman had invoked this principle
to prevent federal common law from upsetting contractual ex23 4
pectations, not from helping to meet such expectations.
This anomalous result shows how unguided preemption, together with gaps in ERISA's substantive provisions, contribute
to creating unwarranted problems. Of course, the district court's
reasoning in Amato may not represent a leading trend in this
field.23 8 For example, In re White Farm Equipment Co.2 6
reached an opposite result where the issue was whether retirees
who had been promised post-retirement health and welfare benefits could enforce that promise under federal common law. Although such benefits had not "accrued" within the technical
meaning of ERISA, the court noted that "nothing in ERISA indicates that Congress intended to make contracts unenforceable.
232. 680 F.2d 301 (3d Cir. 1982).
233. Amato, 596 F. Supp. at 973 (quoting Van Orman, 680 F.2d at 312) (emphasis
added).
234. The Second Circuit also mentioned Van Orman in the context of plaintiffs' common law claim of unjust enrichment. While the district court had relied on Van Orman
for the proposition that "there is no federal common law of unjust enrichment under
ERISA," the Second Circuit said it preferred to reject plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claim
"on a narrower basis." 773 F.2d at 1419. The appellate court stated that, in view of
§§ 403(c)(1) and 404(a)(1) of ERISA (as interpreted by the court) there was no need to
supplement the statute with an ERISA common law of unjust enrichment "in the circumstances of this case." Id. There is no other hint in the opinion that a different set of
circumstances would warrant such a supplementing, although other courts have stated
that such circumstances can exist. See, e.g., Airco Indus. Gases v. Teamsters Health &
Welfare Pension Fund, No. 84-123 MMS (D. Del. Sept. 11, 1985).
235. Certainly its influence should be eclipsed by the Second Circuit's partial reversal, even though the latter court refrained from expressly rejecting the district court's
approach to the federal common law of employee benefit plans.
236. 42 Bankr. 1005 (N.D. Ohio 1984).
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Rather, if the state law is preempted, then the contract must be
construed in accordance with federal law, in this case the federal
common law of contract. 2 3 7 In Kuntz v. Reese, 5 s the court held
that a misrepresentation by a fiduciary to plan participants is a
23
breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA section 404(a)(1)(A)(i), 1
because it "would be anomalous if Congress eliminated the protections offered by state law without providing comparable federal protections. '240 Another court has given a reverse twist to
reasoning of this type in order to decline finding a state law preempted by ERISA. In Scott v. Gulf Oil Corp.,2 41 the court essentially held that, if benefits sought were not part of an actual
plan, state law must govern that claim to ensure the availability
242
of at least some form of relief.
Other cases raise, without answering, questions of a similar
type. Under the facts of Authier v. Ginsberg,4 3 for example,
should it be the case that federal common law gives a fired plan
administrator a cause of action for wrongful discharge because
he is fired for fulfilling pension duties? And where pension benefits are forfeitable upon breaches by ex-employees of noncompetition agreements that would have been illegal under preempted
state laws, should federal common law adopt rules as to which
24
noncompetition agreements are valid and which are not? '
A divided Supreme Court recently aired these kinds of uncertainties in Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell.248 The Ninth Circuit had held that extra-contractual damages could be recovered by a plan participant, under section
409(a) of ERISA, 46 for breach of fiduciary duty based on alleged
237. Id. at 1014-15 (quoting Holliday v. Xerox Corp., 555 F. Supp. 51, 55 (E.D. Mich.
1982), aff'd, 732 F.2d 548 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 294 (1984)). See also Musto
v. American Gen. Corp., 615 F. Supp. 1483, 1497-98 (M.D. Tenn. 1985) (applying federal
common law, informed by state common law principles, to similar retirement benefits);
Cattin v. General Motors Corp., 612 F. Supp. 948 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (applying federal
common law to early retirement benefits not protected by ERISA).
238. 760 F.2d 926 (9th Cir. 1985).
239. 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (1982).
240. Id. at 935 (quoting Russell v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co., 722 F.2d 482,
488 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 3085 (1985)).
241. 754 F.2d 1499 (9th Cir. 1985). See supra text accompanying notes 157-59.
242. 754 F.2d at 1506.
243. 757 F.2d 796 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 208 (1985).
244. Cf. Lojek v. Thomas, 716 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1983) (implying in dicta that ERISA
preempts state common law on the validity of an anticompetition clause in a pension
plan); Hillis v. Waukesha Title Co., 576 F. Supp. 1103 (E.D. Wis. 1983) (discussing the
reasonableness of an anticompetition clause in a pension plan by reference to state law).
245. 105 S. Ct. 3085 (1985).
246. 29 U.S.C. § 1105(a) (1982).
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improper or untimely handling of benefit claims. 4 7 The Supreme Court unanimously reversed, holding that section 409(a)
did not expressly or impliedly offer plaintiffs relief of this kind.
Because the plaintiff in Russell had relied entirely on section
409(a), and expressly disclaimed reliance on section 502(a)(3),
which entitles participants to obtain "appropriate equitable relief" to redress ERISA or plan violations in general, the Court
had no occasion to consider whether any provision of ERISA
other than section 409(a) authorized recovery of extra-contractual damages. 248 Four Justices, however, joined in a concurrence
by Brennan that expressed concern about "dicta in the Court's
opinion . . .that could be construed as sweeping more broadly
than the narrow ground of resolution set forth above,"249 and
about remarks viewed as "simply incompatible with the structure, legislative history, and purposes of ERISA." 250
The concurrence stated that "[t]o the extent the Court suggests that administrators might not be fully subject to strict fiduciary duties to participants and beneficiaries in the processing
of their claims and to traditional trust-law remedies for
breaches of those duties, I could not more strongly disagree."2'51
Whereas the Court expressed a reluctance to "'fine-tune' an enforcement scheme crafted with such evident care as the one in
ERISA,"25 2 the concurrence argued that, insofar as section
502(a)(3) authorized "'other appropriate equitable relief. . . to
redress' ERISA violations . . . . [it] can only be read precisely
as authorizing federal courts to 'fine tune' ERISA's remedial
scheme."2 53 The concurrence characterized the Court's remarks
"about the constrictive judicial role in enforcing ERISA's remedial scheme" as "inaccurate, ' 54 and suggested that what the
Court had done was to ignore ERISA's clear legislative history
calling on courts to develop a federal common law for benefit
255
plans.
The two opinions in Russell reflect sharply divergent views on
the correct approach to creating a federal common law for benefit plans. Given the importance that four Justices, and presumably Congress, ascribed to state sources of benefit plan law, it
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

Russell v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co., 722 F.2d 482 (9th Cir. 1983).
105 S. Ct. at 3089 n.5.
Id. at 3095 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 3093.
Id. at 3097 (Brennan, J., concurring).

254. Id.
255.

Id. at 3097-98 (quoting 120

CONG.

REc. 29,942, 29,933 (1974)).
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seems unfortunate that the other five Justices appeared opposed
to this approach. 2 5" The stark language of section 514(a), when

contrasted with the state trust-law roots of much of ERISA,
does nothing to discourage this gap. Regardless of what the content of that law should be, Congress could have chosen several
approaches to preemption that would have produced less controversy regarding the method of crafting a federal common law for
benefit plans.
A successful preemption approach for these purposes should
be sufficiently flexible to (a) account for differing degrees of past
congressional attention to the different subject matters of
ERISA; (b) allow for a balancing of competing federal and state
interests in setting standards of conduct affecting benefit plans;
and (c) allow for borrowing or enforcement of state laws and
procedures, where extension of federal common law to a particular subject matter would constitute judicial usurpation of a peculiarly legislative function-as would be the case were federal
courts to set out to establish garnishment procedures or criminal
penalties for failures to contribute to benefit plans. Under a regime of this kind, decisions of federal common law would not be
made in the artificial atmosphere of a state-law vacuum. Where
appropriate, state law would control; and in other circumstances,
courts would fashion federal common law with due regard to
state-established norms of behavior.
256. The concurring opinion of Justice Brennan in Russell provides an important and
perceptive statement of the importance of state law sources of this federal common law:
I believe that, in resolving this and other questions concerning appropriate relief
under ERISA, courts should begin by ascertaining the extent to which trust and
pension law as developed by state and federal courts provide for recovery by the
beneficiary above and beyond the benefits that have been withheld; this is the
logical first step, given that Congress intended to incorporate trust law into
18
ERISA's equitable remedies.
18. "Where the courts are required themselves to fashion a federal rule of decision, the source of that law must be federal and uniform. Yet, state law where
compatible with national policy may be resorted to and adopted as a federal rule
of decision ....
Here, of course, there is little federal law to which the court
may turn for guidance. State regulation of insurance, pensions, and other such
programs, however, provides a pre-existing source of experience and experiment
in an area in which there is, as yet, only federal inexperience. Much of what the
states have thus far developed, particularly in the insurance field, is statutory. In
certain areas of public concern, the state legislatures have been quite active in
enacting comprehensive regulatory schemes, and state statutory sources of law
will no doubt play a major role in the development of a federal common law
under ERISA, particularly in defining rights under employee benefit plans."
Id. at 3098-99 (quoting Wayne Chem., Inc. v. Columbus Agency Serv. Corp., 426 F.
Supp. 316, 325 (N.D. Ind.), modified on other grounds, 567 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1977)
(emphasis added)).
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CONCLUSION

The language of ERISA section 514(a) has made it impossible
to develop a sound or internally consistent jurisprudence of
ERISA preemption. Some positions that are fully justified, indeed required, by faithful adherence to the literal language of
section 514 simply constitute bad policy, and would not, absent
the rigid language of the statute, be adopted by the courts. Congress's delay in enacting needed statutory amendments probably
served to heighten the perception that section 514(a) need not
be taken too literally. The fairly strict adherence to the plain
meaning of section 514(a) that has been demonstrated by the
Supreme Court, however, and the obvious reluctance of Congress to enact any but the most limited or compelling exceptions
to preemption, have undoubtedly clarified that in all but the
most unusual case the preemption rule of ERISA is to be applied quite broadly and literally.
The clearly mandated but sweeping application of section
514(a) not only voids myriad state laws, it leaves grave uncertainties about how and whether to fill the gaps they created. Because there are enormous gaps to fill, the absence of guiding policy creates unfortunate difficulties and pressures for the courts.
If the gaps are to be filled, the courts must derive a federal common law concerning trusts, fiduciary duties, contracts, remedies,
and the like by reference to existing, largely state law sources.
Some courts have seized on the combination of preemption and
federal silence as a basis for ignoring such sources; others have
reached the opposite conclusion. 'Had Congress made it clear
that state policy concerns had a legitimate role to play in preemption issues, the transition from state to federal regulation of
benefit plans would be smoother and less arbitrary. The Supreme Court's decision in Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance
Co. v. Russell257 displays a clear lack of consensus on the basic
policies that must inform this transition. The only safe prediction is that the process will continue to lurch forward and backward unpredictably, in large part because the rigidity and sweep
of section 514(a) defy credibility and common sense in many
cases, and because, when applied as written, it leaves courts
without adequate guidance with respect to how and the extent
to which to fashion a federal common law for employee benefit
plans.

257.

105 S. Ct. 3085 (1985).

